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Introduction 
Since the early days of modern democracies, studies of representation have aimed to 
conceptualise representation, both in normative and practical terms (e.g. Eulau et al. 1959, 
Wahlke et al. 1962, Pitkin 1967, Thomassen 1994, Blomberg and Rozenberg 2012a). This 
reflects the importance of both understanding what is expected of representative democracy as 
well as the success of those who represent in meeting those expectations. The content and the 
form of the political linkage between electors and the elected is disputed, both due to different 
ideas about how representation ought to work and due to differences in expectations of 
representation in modern democracies.  
Representation is, in essence, about the link between those who represent and those who 
are represented. In modern democracies, voters grant political parties and/or candidates a 
mandate to make decisions on their behalf. Thus parties and/or candidates act as agents on behalf 
of the principals that are the voters (Andeweg and Thomassen 2005). In most modern 
democracies, political parties are the main actors as intermediates between the electors and the 
elected (e.g. Mair 2006, Müller 2000, Dalton 1985). Political parties present policy packages that 
voters can choose from and representatives of political parties act on behalf of voters within the 
constraints put on them both by their party and the political system within which they operate 
(Strøm 2012, Aldrich 2011). Studies on representation commonly focus on how individual 
legislators behave within the context of their party and the political system (e.g. Gauja 2012, 
Best and Vogel 2012) providing useful insights into how representation works in practice. Given 
that representation in most modern democracies is about a collective (e.g. political parties) 
representing a collective (e.g. party voters) (Castiglione and Warren 2006) the individual-level 
focus is limited when it comes to analysing the demand and the supply sides of representation 
together; the dyadic link between the represented and those who represent (Schmitt 2007). The 
approach taken in this project is to conceptualise representation at the level of those collectives 
as party dyads, where a dyad consists of a party and its voters, and as such is in line with the 
partisan-constituency model (Ezrow 2010).  
The present PhD project aims to shed light on one piece in the puzzle of representation 
which is about how its nature affects its outcome. The nature of representation is about its input, 
how and whom to represent, while the outcome of representation relates to how it manifests, and 
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those two are commonly analysed separately (Andeweg and Thomassen 2005). Given that the 
nature of representation has consequences for its outcome, it is also undertaken in this project to 
examine what factors contribute to the variety in the nature of representation.  
This PhD project consists of three papers, two of them already published in peer-
reviewed journals. Those two papers are about what determines the nature of representation 
emphasised within parties (Önnudóttir 2014b) and the consequences of those for objective 
outcome of representation (Önnudóttir 2014a). The third paper is about the link between the 
nature of representation and subjective outcome of representation and it is currently being 
reviewed. Each paper is discussed in more details below.  
 
Models of representation 
 
Nature of representation 
Two dominant models of representation have been heavily disputed, the trustee versus delegate 
model, and the political parties model (Thomassen 1994). The former relates to the mandate-
independence controversy, whether elected representatives should behave as trustees and follow 
their own judgment when making decisions, or as delegates acting according to the will of 
voters. The political party model, often referred to as the Responsible Party Model (RPM) 
(American Political Science Association 1950) is based on the principle that parties offer 
different policy packages and representatives of the parties follow the parties’ policies. Voters 
are both aware of the policy packages offered by parties and their own, and they vote for the 
party that is closest to their own preferences. Both those models of representation have been 
criticised for being both unrealistic and too strict.  
The delegate versus trustee role was first discussed by Burke in his speech to the electors 
of Bristol in 1774 (e.g. Thomassen 1994). However, it was not until Eulau et al. (1959) 
conceptualised it as two different ideal types of roles of representation that it became a matter of 
academic debate as a model for representation. In Eulau et al’s. distinction between the focus and 
style of representation, the delegate and trustee roles are types of styles of representation that 
have to do with what criterion representatives should use when making decisions. Focus of 
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representation is about whom to represent, whether that is for example the constituency, party 
voters or the nation as a whole.  
Thomassen (1994) points out that the idea of an instructed delegate can be traced back to 
the early days of parliamentarianism, when local representatives were appointed to defend the 
interest of their region, mainly regarding issues of taxes, against the king or head of state in 
feudal societies. The idea was that they were representatives of their region and as such were 
supposedly instructed by those living within their region. This is in line with the idea that in 
practice those who are delegates are also more likely to consider themselves as representatives of 
their region whereas trustees consider their focus of representation to be the nation as a whole 
(Bengtsson and Wass 2011, Wessles and Giebler 2011). Thomassen (1994) traces the ideal of the 
trustee back to Rousseau and the French revolution, when it became a constitutional practice to 
instruct representatives to follow their own judgement and not take orders from others. Using the 
same example, Rozenberg and Blomgren (2012) argue that the trustee style is generally 
promoted as the legitimate role of representation in modern Europe. Thus the trustee style might 
be in line with what the constitutional practice expects, but those expectations do not always 
reflect the reality of political representation.  
Both the delegate and the trustee role have been criticised for being outdated and 
unrealistic in modern mass democracies (Thomassen 1994, Rehfeld 2009), but nevertheless, they 
are still quite dominant both in popular and in academic debate about representation (e.g. 
Andeweg 2012, Fox and Shotts 2009, Rehfeld 2009, Bengtsson and Wass 2011). That is 
because, not without flaws, the distinction touches upon core elements of democratic 
representation; about whom and how to represent. The popular debate about representation is 
quite often focused on the idea that elected representatives should follow the will of voters, that 
is to say, they should behave as delegates. Even if this ignores the heterogeneity of voters and 
that it is unclear how the ‘will of voters’ on issues should be signalled to elected representatives, 
this shows that models of representation are not only the concern of academic debate; it concerns 
the interest of citizens in all modern democracies. 
In Miller and Stokes’ (1963) ‘diamond model’, representatives can either act as trustees 
or delegates; but their role-conception is not a necessary prerequisite for congruence between 
representatives and those who are represented. Their model points out that there is flexibility for 
shared views, even if representatives behave as trustees. Representatives can either be chosen by 
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voters because the voters share the views of the elected or they are chosen as instructed delegates 
following the voters will in their behaviour as legislators. In their model, the instructed delegate 
style only works for representation when representatives’ (who are delegates) perception of their 
constituencies’ attitudes are correct. In applying this model to legislators roll-call behaviour in 
the United States, they find that on some issues there is a greater correspondence between 
representatives and their voters, most notably issues concerning social welfare and civil rights, 
and less congruence on issues such as foreign policy.  
The application of the Miller and Stokes’ model in Europe has been less convincing 
compared to the US, for the reason that in Europe, political parties are the main actors as policy 
makers, not individual representatives (e.g. Müller 2000). Both the Miller and Stokes’ model and 
the trustee versus delegate typology ignore the role of political parties in modern democracies 
(Thomassen 1994). For that reason, it is common to add the partisan role as a style of 
representation, as is done by Converse and Pierce (1986) in their study on representation in 
France. Under the partisan style, representatives follow their party’s policy and are as such in 
line the RPM. As already mentioned, the ideal of RPM is that parties offer policy packages that 
are known to voters, and parties exercise control over their representatives to make sure they 
follow the party line. RPM recognises that political parties are one of the main actors in the 
representational bond between voters and the elected, but it is less of a theory of representation 
and more an ideal about how representation ought to work practice. The model is too strict 
assuming that voters are aware of both their own policy preferences and the policy packages 
offered by parties and it gives too little flexibility for individual representatives to deviate from 
the party line (Valen and Narud 2007, Wessels and Giebler 2011).  
 The criticisms on the two main strands discussed so far, the delegate versus trustee model 
(commonly adding the partisan style) and the RPM, both reflect that they are about normative 
expectations about representation and how it ought to work. The models are not necessarily 
failing as such, but the normative ideal has to be realistic and it should be recognised that 
representation in modern democracies can take on different forms under different circumstances 
(e.g. Thomassen 1994, Blomgren and Rozenberg 2012b). There is no such thing as only one way 
to represent; such as being either a delegate all the time, or following only own judgement or to 
always follow the party line. Representatives take on different roles under different 
circumstances; for example different factors can influence their behaviour as legislators as 
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compared to how they think about and interact with voters. In this example, the former falls 
under legislative roles and the latter under representative roles (Rozenberg and Blomgren 2012).  
A threefold classification into trustee, delegate and partisan styles belongs to 
representational roles, and this classification is one of the main themes of the present PhD 
project. The literature has suggested several perspectives for understanding style of 
representation, for example the functionalist perspective, the motivational approach and the 
rational approach (Blomgren and Rozenberg 2012b). The functionalist perspective was largely 
abandoned in the early 1980s, mainly because empirical findings did not support the idea that 
style of representation reflects some underlying holistic function of the representational process 
in modern democracies. The motivational approach is to study style of representation according 
to how the representatives define their own roles and tasks, taking account of the institutional 
setting within which they operate. The rational approach is to understand styles of representation 
as strategies representatives use to reach their goals. In this project, I make use of the rational 
approach, but instead of focusing on individual representatives, I focus on the characteristics of 
their political parties.  
Under Strøm’s (2012) rational choice approach, the style representatives take on is 
conditioned by the requirements they have to meet in order to reach their goals. Political parties 
are one of the main actors conditioning their members’ career paths, regardless of whether their 
goal is being elected as an MP or to work for the party and the party’s success in any other way 
(Aldrich 2011). The increasing complexity of the issue space and growing number of median 
independent voters as opposed to ideological partisan voters has created what Rohrschneider and 
Whitefield (2012) call the ‘strain of representation’. They find that in more affluent societies 
where the share of independent voters is higher in the electorate compared to less affluent 
societies, there is less policy congruence between parties and voters. This strain, together with 
parties control over their members’ career paths, could create different incentives for parties to 
emphasise different styles of representation. The trustee style might be a useful strategy to 
mobilise independent voters, the partisan style could be induced by constraints of parties over 
nomination of their candidates, and the delegate style could work better the more homogeneous 
party voters are. Thus, the extent to which the three styles are emphasised within parties could 
both depend on the variety in parties’ profile (e.g. characteristics of both party and its voters) and 
the institutional set-up of parties.  
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Outcome of representation 
Both the normative and practical debate about the pros and cons of democracy relates to how it 
works in practice and is as such about the outcome of representation. It is debated whether and to 
what extent, parties do represent their voters on policies, commonly operationalised as 
congruence on a left-right scale (e.g. Golder and Stramski 2010, Rohrschneider and Whitefield 
2012). The outcome of representation has also been captured as congruence on more specific 
issue scales (e.g. Hooghe et al. 2002, Lutz et al. 2012) and as political support for the political 
system (e.g. Fuchs 1999, Baviskar and Malone 2004) even if not always spelled out explicitly as 
‘outcome of representation’. Congruence on issues and/or policies is here labelled as ‘the 
objective outcomes of representation’ given that it is driven by policy preferences. Political 
support is labelled as ‘the subjective outcomes of representation’ driven by voters’ expectations 
about representation and their perceptions about its’ performance. Each is here discussed in turn.  
 
Objective outcome of representation 
There is a general agreement about the importance of examining policy congruence as well as 
the idea that high congruence indicates good political representation (Andeweg 2012). However, 
there is a considerable disagreement about what congruence is or what it should be about 
(Hellwig 2008), whether it is elite- or mass-driven (Schmitt and Thomassen 2000, Holmberg 
2011) and how best to measure it (van der Eijk 2001, Golder and Stramski 2010, Andeweg 
2011). The distinction between the European party systems and the US candidate centred politics 
is of importance. The dividing view between the individual-level focus and the collective focus 
of representation is partly because of the different political realities studies of representation do 
focus on, whether it is a party based system or a candidate based system. Under an individual 
perspective on congruence, the focus is on the constituency voters and their elected 
representatives, while the collective perspective is on parties and party voters; and the latter is 
more appropriate when examining representation in Europe as compared to the US (Dalton 
1985).  
 How the institutional setting of the electoral system affects congruence has received a 
considerable attention. Golder and Stramski (2010) find that in majoritarian systems, there is 
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higher policy congruence between voters and the government (many to one) and in proportional 
systems between voters and the parliament (many to many). The focus of their study is on the 
link between all citizens and those who represent which is a general electoral model of 
congruence, whereas the partisan constituency model focuses on the link between parties and 
their voters (Ezrow 2011). Contrasting the general electorate model and the partisan constituency 
model brings to attention what is the unifying link between those who represent and those who 
are represented. When voters vote for parties, the unifying link on policy between the 
represented and those who represent are the parties. The difference between position issues and 
valence issues (e.g. Green 2007) can be of importance here. The partisan constituency model is 
the appropriate focus when theorising about and analysing congruence in party based systems on 
position issues, which are issues where there is a disagreement about, such as social security and 
privatisation. Whereas the general electorate model might be more appropriate when theorising 
and analysing congruence on valence issues, which are issues that voters and parties do in 
general agree about, such as on economic prosperity and fighting crime.  
The most common way to measure policy congruence is to use the left-right scale as a 
denominator for various issues that unite or divide the elected and the electors (e.g. Powell 2009, 
van der Eijk 2001). Even if the left-right scale incorporates various issues and might be less 
relevant than it used to be historically (Powell 2009) it still distinguishes between parties’ policy 
positions. Parties and voters have a similar understanding about what issues constitute the left-
right scale, even if the content changes over time and differs between countries (van der Eijk and 
Schmitt 2010). Thus the left-right scale reflects position issues to a greater extent than valence 
issues (because parties differ on the scale), and congruence on the left-right symbolically unites 
the represented and those who represent (e.g. Eulau and Karps 1977, Belchior 2013). 
Congruence on the left-right scale is as such a relevant measure for an objective outcome of 
representation.  
 
Subjective outcome of representation 
Political support of the public is important for the consolidation and legitimacy of the political 
system (Diamond 1999, Mishler and Rose 2001) and as such can be regarded as a subjective 
outcome of representation. Determinants of political support are commonly studied either on the 
individual level (e.g. Aarts and Thomassen 2008, Dalton 2008), on the level of political systems 
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(e.g. Norris 2011) or as an interplay between those two levels (e.g. Kubbe 2013, Stokemer and 
Sundstrøm 2013). This PhD project takes a different approach focusing on political support on 
the level of political parties.  
 What people expect of democracy is important when it comes to understanding what 
drives political support. Different groups of voters differ in what they expect of democracy. 
Some groups emphasise the importance of the means of democracy in terms of the formal setting 
of the representative system while others emphasise its ends in terms of what it delivers (e.g. 
Fuchs 1999, Baviskar and Malone 2004). Céka and Magelhães (2015) find that those that have 
higher social status are more likely to defend and support the status quo of democracy, while the 
underprivileged are more likely to support a change such as more support for referendums or 
other means that are not present in their political system. They argue that this reflects a ‘winners 
and losers’ status, where the underprivileged have more to gain from a change while the winners 
feel securer in their position and feel no need for a change in the democratic system. 
 Models of representation, considering political support, have to take into account both the 
different expectations voters have of representation and the difference in how it is carried out 
under different circumstances and settings. With the loosening of a traditional social-class 
system and Rohrschneider and Whitefield’s (2012) ‘strain of representation’, parties in modern 
democracies are faced with the challenge of how to represent increasingly heterogeneous voters; 
where diverse groups of voters might have different expectations about representation. Different 
groups of party voters can hold different expectations about democracy and they can express 
different levels of political support depending on their expectations. For example, it has been 
found that satisfaction with democracy, a common indicator of political support, is higher among 
voters of government parties than opposition parties (Holmberg 1999). Given that parties are one 
of the main actors in carrying out representation, it is meaningful to theorise and examine party 
voters’ political support as a subjective outcome of representation, as is undertaken in the present 
PhD project. 
 Summing up, the three papers that constitute the present PhD are about the nature and 
outcome of representation and they are all on the level of party dyads. The first paper is about 
what explains the variety in the nature of representation emphasised within parties. The second 
and third papers are about how the variety in the nature of representation explains objective 
outcome in terms of policy congruence between parties and party voters, and how it explains 
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subjective outcome of representation in terms of party voters’ political support. The main results 
of each paper are discussed briefly below, followed by a more extensive discussion about the 
implications of the results. 
 
A summary of the main results 
The first published paper, ‘Political parties and styles of representation’, is about how parties’ 
characteristics, and to some extent characteristics’ of party voters, explain the nature of 
representation (Önnudóttir 2014b). The nature of representation is divided into the extent to 
which the partisan, delegate or trustee styles are emphasised within parties. The main results are 
that the more control the parties’ leaderships’ have over nomination and greater party 
socialisation, both go together with the partisan style being the prevalent style within parties. The 
findings also show that the more often parties have been represented in government, the more 
likely they are to contain a high number of trustees. This is suggested to be explained by both a 
socialisation effect of parties’ governing experience and the ‘strain of representation’; the 
dilemma about how parties should represent both the median independent voter and the partisan 
ideological voter. Under this strain, parties might promote the trustee style as a strategy to 
maximise their share of votes to make them a viable candidate for government. Greater 
experience in representing might also socialise representatives of government parties into the 
trustee style, given that they more often have to justify their actions as being for ‘the greater 
good’ – a focus of representation that is closely linked to the trustee style.  
For the delegate style, the results are not as clear as for the partisan and trustee style, but 
the findings show that delegate parties have a higher proportion of voters that do identify with 
their party. A possible explanation for this is that party identifiers of a given party agree both 
with their party and with other party identifiers of that party to a greater extent than independent 
voters, and thus it is easier for those parties to emphasise the delegate style.  
The second published paper, ‘Policy congruence and style of representation: Party voters 
and political parties’, is about how policy congruence, as objective outcome of representation, is 
determined by the extent to which the partisan, delegate or trustee style are prevalent within 
parties (Önnudóttir 2014a). The main findings show that a higher proportion of partisans results 
in less congruence between parties and party voters on the left right scale, whereas the trustee 
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style results in more congruence. For the objective outcome of representation, the extent to 
which the delegate style is emphasised has negligent effect on policy congruence. The low 
congruence between partisan parties and their voters contradicts the Responsible Party Model 
(RPM), and it is suggested that parties that exercise greater control over its representatives to 
keep them in line with the parties’ policy, do so at the cost of congruence with voters on the left-
right scale. The positive link between the trustee style and greater congruence supports that the 
trustee style might be a successful strategy when it comes to mobilising independent median 
voters in modern mass democracies.  
The third paper, ‘Styles of representation and voters’ evaluations of democratic 
performance: Parties and party voters’ (currently being reviewed), shows that the variety in the 
nature of representation has consequences for party voters political support as a subjective 
outcome of representation. Political support is captured as party voters’ evaluations of the 
performance of democracy on a scale of ten items, where each item is weighted by its’ perceived 
importance for democracy. The findings show that the trustee style is positively related to 
political support; the higher the proportion of trustees within parties, the more positively do party 
voters rate the performance of democracy. The relation for the delegate style is reverse; the more 
that style is emphasised, the more negatively democratic performance is rated, while the effect 
for the partisan style is negligible. It is argued that the negative relation between the delegate 
style and party voters’ evaluations of democratic performance reflects that the delegate style is 
both an unrealistic and a populist model for representation. It is unrealistic in the sense that there 
is no such thing as a ‘single will of voters’ that can be made known to representatives. Referring 
to voters’ as a united group’ and that a party is representing the ‘will of voters’ is a common 
thread among right-wing populist parties (Jagers and Walgrave 2007). Such parties commonly 
mobilise on voters’ discontent and that could thus explain the negative relation found between 
delegate parties and their voters’ evaluation of democratic performance. Again, the negligible 
effect on voters’ subjective evaluation of performance found for the partisan style contradicts 
RPM, and the positive one for the trustee style shows the success of that style as a model for 
representation.  
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Discussion 
The discussion about models of representation is important because it reflects a normative and a 
practical debate about how representation ought to be carried out. Implicit in this discussion is 
that the nature of representation has consequences for its outcome; but it is rarely spelled out 
how and in what form. For example, at first sight, it could seem to be implicit that the delegate 
style should result in a closer bond between the policy preferences of delegate representatives 
and their voters. This assumption wrongly assumes that delegates follow the will of voters 
because they agree with voters. The only thing that the delegate style requires is that the will of 
the voters should be decisive, regardless of representatives’ own opinion, or the policy of their 
party. Thus there is no obvious link between the delegate style and an agreement between the 
elected and the electors on policy, unless it is assumed that representatives take on the delegate 
style because they agree with voters.  
Of importance here is that the difference between styles of representation, divided into 
partisan, trustee and delegate styles, is what criterion representatives use for (or claim to use) 
decision making. In the delegate and partisan styles, the criterion is in both cases a collective; the 
voters for delegates and the party’s policy for the partisans. In both cases it is considered 
appropriate for decision making that the ‘will of the collective’ should be decisive regardless of 
representatives’ own opinion or the opinions of other groups than those that constitute the 
relevant collective. In both cases representatives’ own policy preferences can deviate from the 
preferences of the relevant collective. The emphasis is on that representatives’ policy choices and 
decision makings reflect the preference of the ‘collective’ whether that is voters or the party’s 
policy. Only in the case of the trustee style, the criterion for decision making coincides with the 
policy preferences of the representatives’ themselves. This is because they supposedly use their 
own judgement when making decisions.  
The trustee versus delegate typology has been criticised for being outdated and not 
relevant for modern European party systems. Still, this typology commonly adding the role of a 
partisan, does reflect both a normative discussion about representative democracy and how it 
should and does work in practice. Considering that those three styles of representation are 
representative roles in the sense that they do reflect how representatives think about their role, 
and they are not legislative roles in the sense how they cast their vote in the parliament, draws 
attention to that representatives can and do take on different roles under different circumstances. 
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For example, styles of representation are a much more plausible explanation for how 
representatives differ in how they approach their voters than legislative roles are. For example, 
Andeweg shows (2012) that representatives that favour a ‘bottom-up’ representation (policy 
preferences of voters should be incorporated into their party’s policy), which is in line with the 
delegate style, are in more contact with voters compared to representatives who favour ‘top-
down’ representation (elite-driven politics), which is in line with the trustee and/or partisan style, 
and the latter group are in more contact with ministers and officials to discuss voters’ affairs. 
When considering how representatives cast their vote in the legislative, they do in an 
overwhelming majority of cases cast their vote according to their parties’ policy (e.g. Kristinsson 
2011). However, representative styles are more likely to come into play considering the 
difference in how representatives approach their work that leads up to a roll-call vote (e.g. 
committee work and formal and informal negotiations between parties) (Thomassen 1994).  
Notwithstanding the criticism on RPM, that it is unrealistic and too strict, it does have 
some truth to it. The most plausible part relates to the constraints the parties put on their 
representatives to follow their party’s policy and some parties exercise more control than others. 
Most notably is that the more dependent candidates are on their party for nomination and 
election, the more likely they are to be partisans (Wessels and Giebler 2011, Zittel 2012) and this 
is confirmed in the present PhD. Because this link is dependent upon the extent to which parties 
have and do exercise control over their representatives’ career paths, one cannot state that RPM 
works as a model, because it only works for some parties and not for others. What RPM does 
however, is to draw attention to the role of political parties in representative democracies and 
reflects a normative discussion about how political parties ought to work.  
The findings of this present PhD, that there is a systematic difference in the extent to 
which the partisan, trustee or delegate styles are emphasised within parties, depending on 
characteristics of parties and party voters, show that this threefold classification does reflect a 
political reality. Under the rational choice approach, it is hypothesised and tested how different 
characteristics of parties and party voters are systematically linked to the extent to which each 
style is emphasised within parties. Finding that parties’ leadership’s control over nomination 
increases the proportion of partisans within parties and decreases the proportion of trustees tells 
two things. When representatives’ career paths are constrained by their party, they take on the 
partisan role as a strategy to advance their career for and within the party. The less 
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representatives’ career path is dependent upon their party, the trustee style is emphasised at the 
cost of the partisan style. In that case, the trustee style might be more rational for them to help 
them advance their political career. Parties’ leaderships control over nomination is also 
positively related to the proportion of the delegate style within parties. This relation becomes 
more interesting when looking at the effect of party socialisation on styles of representation. 
More party socialisation goes together with greater emphasis on the partisan style and a lesser 
emphasis on the delegate style. Taken together, parties’ leaderships control over nomination 
seems to induce both the partisan and the delegate styles, whereas party socialisation has an 
opposite effect on the two styles. This could indicate that young and idealistic party members 
might be more likely to support the idea that the ‘will of voters’ should be decisive, but once 
they have gained experience in working within and for the party, and in that party the leadership 
controls nomination, they take on the partisan role if they want to succeed.  
 Regarding the outcome of representation, the greater the number of partisans the less 
congruence there is between parties and party voters on left right as an objective outcome of 
representation. For political support, as a subjective outcome of representation, the proportion of 
partisans has a negligible effect. It is notable that this negligible effect is in the same direction as 
for policy congruence, that is to say, a higher proportion of partisans goes together with both less 
congruence on left-right and party voters’ negative evaluation of the performance of democracy, 
even if the latter is not statistically significant. Less policy congruence between partisan parties 
and their voters shows (again) that RPM does not work as an overarching model for 
representation. A possible explanation for the lack of congruence between partisan parties and 
their voters, is that those parties are further to the ends of the left-right spectrum. That those are 
ideological parties, that follow a doctrine of a political thought and as such they have to exercise 
greater control over their representatives to keep them in line with the party’s policy. Given that 
voters are in general less polarised, those parties keep their representatives in line at the cost of 
policy congruence with voters.  
For delegate parties, it is hypothesised and tested whether their voters are more 
homogeneous compared to voters of other parties. That is based on Strøm’s (2012) rational 
approach; that it is easier to advocate the delegate style when voters are alike. Under such 
circumstances, it is more likely that one and united ‘will of voters’ exists and can be mobilised 
on. Given that issue positions of party identifiers are more alike than issue positions of 
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independent voters (Rohrschneider and Whitefield 2012), it is tested and found that parties that 
have a large base of party identifiers among their voters are more likely to emphasise the 
delegate style. This effect is weak, but nevertheless statistically significant.  
A possible explanation for the link between the delegate style and the proportion of party 
identifiers among their voters, and for this there are some indicators that should be considered for 
a future research, is that the delegate style is more prominent among populist parties. That is, the 
few parties in the present data, where the delegate style is emphasised by half of more of its 
candidates, are all extreme right-wing parties (National Font and List DeDecker in Belgium and 
Jobbik in Hungary). Furthermore, in the ‘True Finns’, the Finnish anti-immigration party, the 
delegate style is emphasised to a greater extent compared to other Finnish parties, even if it does 
not exceed the fifty percent limit applied to the aforementioned parties. In addition to this, 
political support, as in party voters’ evaluations of democratic performance, is less when the 
proportion of delegates is higher. Given that right-wing populist parties mobilise on and/or fuel 
voters discontent and anti-establishment sentiments (van der Brug 2003, Rydgren 2005) gives a 
reason to believe that the delegate style fits the populist messages of those parties, referring to 
the idea that the ‘will of the voters’ should be decisive as opposed the political elites’. Thus, in 
terms of subjective outcome of representation, voters of delegate parties express lower political 
support compared to voters of other parties. Considering the objective outcome of representation, 
policy congruence on left-right, there seems to be no relation at all between that and whether 
parties promote the delegate style or not. That could possibly be because delegate parties do not 
campaign on the issues that line up along the left-right scale, and instead they campaign and 
mobilise on voters’ dissatisfaction with democratic performance. This line of thought, the link 
between the delegate style and the campaign style of populist parties is a clear avenue for a 
future research.  
 Apart from the aforementioned link between parties’ leaderships control over nomination 
with the trustee style, that style is also linked to parties’ representation in government. The more 
often a party has been represented in government, the more likely it is to contain a high 
proportion of trustees. As such, the trustee style is in line with modernisation and post-materialist 
values emphasising self-autonomy and individual expression (Rozenberg and Blomgren 2012). 
Modernisation and post-materialist values have brought about less emphasis on class-based 
politics, leading to a lesser focus on representing a specific class and more on representing 
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different interests that cut across traditional social classes (Inglehart and Rabier 1986). As 
discussed by Rohrschneider and Whitefield (2012), voters in modern democracies are more 
heterogeneous than they used to be; this, together with a more complex issue space, is a 
challenge political parties are faced with as representative agents. It can be reasoned that in more 
heterogeneous societies both the delegate and the partisan style are less successful as strategies to 
mobilise votes, given that the aim of parties is to secure as many voters as possible to be a viable 
option for government. Under such circumstances, the trustee style might be more successful as a 
useful strategy to mobilise voters that are heterogeneous. 
 The link between representation in government and the trustee style can also be due to a 
socialisation effect. Representatives of parties that have more often been part of the government 
should be more used to justifying their actions as being for the greater good. That is, they are 
more accustomed to considering themselves to represent the nation as a whole, a focus of 
representation that generally coincides with the trustee style. The argument here is that the link 
between representation in government and the trustee style is a mix of both; a socialisation effect 
on the one hand and on the other hand a strategy to get as many votes as needed to be considered 
as a government party. Strengthening this argument is that policy congruence is greater the 
higher the proportion of trustees. Government-seeking parties have to capture the votes of as 
many voters as possible, and given that the majority of voters are around the centre, the best 
strategy to capture votes that are both a little bit to the left and a little bit to the right of the 
centre, is to campaign on competency; that the party’s representatives are competent enough to 
both make compromises and to deal with the political problems they will be faced with in 
government.  
 The trustee style is not only positively linked with policy congruence as objective 
outcome of representation; it is also positively linked with political support as subjective 
outcome of representation. Voters of trustee parties evaluate democratic performance more 
positively than voters of other parties. It is argued that this reflects that the trustee style is a 
successful strategy to mobilise heterogeneous voters, on an issue space that has become 
increasingly diverse. As argued by Rozenberg and Blomgren (2012), the trustee style is in line 
with post-materialist values, self-autonomy and genuine deliberation. It is not fashionable to take 
orders from others such as voters or a party. Again, under Rohsrchneider and Whitefield’s ‘strain 
of representation’, the trustee style might be a successful strategy to mobilise diverse voters. This 
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does not have to indicate that political parties and partisanship are outdated. Rather, this could 
reflect that the old class-based party system is less relevant today than it used to be and that party 
competition is now based on different cleavages. ‘New’ cleavages on the political agenda, such 
as the protection of the environment or immigration (Hooghe et al.2001) do not cut as clearly 
through social-class as ‘older’ traditional issues such as privatisation and social-security. The 
‘new’ issues are an add-on to the political issue space, and given that parties cannot mobilise on 
those issues related to social-class as they could on the ‘older’ issues, they have to convince 
voters that they are competent enough to deal with all those issues. Under those circumstances, 
the trustee style might work better, than both the partisan and the delegate style, to maximise 
votes. It could work better than the partisan style, because following the partisan style, could 
send the message that representatives of such parties have to follow a rigid party doctrine that 
does not necessarily incorporate all relevant issues on the political agenda. The trustee style 
would work better than the delegate style, because the latter style would be unsuccessful in 
capturing the votes of diverse voters.  
 Even if the analysis in this present PhD is on the collective level of parties and their 
voters, the findings give insights into what to expect on the individual level; what factors 
determine which style of representation individual candidates take on, and what affects 
congruence and political support of different groups of voters. Here, the difference in what voters 
expect of democracy should be taken into account as well as the institutional settings of political 
systems and make-up of political parties. To conclude, this present PhD project shows that 
characteristics of parties and party voters are important factors explaining the variety in nature of 
representation emphasised within parties, and that this variety explains differences in both 
objective and subjective outcome of representation.  
Hereafter are the three papers in the following order: ‘Policy congruence and style of 
representation: Party voters and political parties’ (Önnudóttir 2014a), ‘Political parties and 
styles of representation’ (Önnudóttir 2014b) and ‘Styles of representation and voters’ evaluation 
of democratic performance: Parties and party voters’ (manuscript under review).  
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Political parties and styles
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University of Mannheim, Germany
Abstract
This paper focuses on how characteristics of parties and party voters explain the styles of representation emphasised
within parties. Styles of representation are defined at the party level as the proportion of representatives within
parties who are partisans, delegates or trustees. Each style manifests due to different incentives related to the
characteristics of their party and/or their party voters. The findings show that the main explanatory factors for the
proportion of partisans are parties’ leadership control over nomination and party socialisation. The main determinant
for the proportion of trustees is how often parties have been represented in government. For delegates the results
are mixed, but it is indicated that a high proportion of party identifiers among party voters is related to a high
proportion of delegates within parties.
Keywords
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Introduction
In recent years, there has been a renewed interest in study-
ing politicians’ styles of representation and legislative roles
(e.g. Blomgren and Rozenberg, 2012b). There is a growing
consensus that the Responsible Party Model (American
Political Science Association, 1950) (RPM) that has heav-
ily influenced studies of representation is too simplistic
(e.g. Bengtsson and Wass, 2011; Valen and Narud, 2007;
Wessels and Giebler, 2011). One of the requirements of the
RPM to be effective is that representatives should follow
their party’s policies; that is to say, they should ideally all
be partisans for representation to work. This contradicts the
classic notion originally used to explain representation in
the US that divides representatives into either trustees or
delegates, where trustees use their own judgment to make
decisions while delegates supposedly follow voters’ opin-
ion regardless of their own stand on particular issues (e.g.
Eulau et al., 1959). Examining representation in France,
Converse and Pierce (1986) show that the partisan style
together with the trustee and delegate styles are closer to
capturing the practice of political representation. Rozen-
berg and Blomgren (2012) argue that this same threefold
classification is linked to both a normative and a philoso-
phical debate on representation, with the major question
being how elected representatives should make decisions
in modern democracies. These three different roles reflect
the different sources representatives use, or claim to
use, to make decisions in their work as representatives
– specifically when there are conflicting opinions.
The core of political representation is that there is a
political relation between representatives and those they
represent (Castiglione and Warren, 2006). Political repre-
sentation is socially constructed, and it is important to
understand the context within which it emerges and oper-
ates. In the early days of democracy, the concept of politi-
cal representation was attributed to legislatures as a whole
and only later did it become a feature of individual repre-
sentatives and parties (Pitkin, 1967, in Castiglione and
Warren, 2006). This shows that representation was first,
and still is, a collective (e.g. a legislature or a party) repre-
senting a collective (e.g. the nation or party voters). The
representation of those collectives is carried out by individ-
uals operating within parties, and the electorate votes for
those parties. This indicates that it is meaningful to analyse
styles of representation at the party level, and how parties
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differ in the emphasis of their representatives (those who
constitute a collective) on different styles of representation.
In this paper, styles of representation are divided into the
proportions of representatives within each party who are
trustees, partisans or delegates. The four main explanatory
factors for which style is prevalent within parties are: the
proportion of candidates who are nominated by the leader-
ship of their respective parties; the proportion of repre-
sentatives who have a background as locally and/or
regionally elected representatives; how often parties have
been represented in government; and the proportion of
party identifiers among their voters. In this paper, I use
the term ‘representatives’ interchangeably with ‘candi-
dates’, referring to both actual and potential representa-
tives for their respective parties.
Styles of representation
Eulau et al. (1959) make the distinction between the focus
and style of representation. Focus refers to the group repre-
sented, such as constituency voters, party voters or the
nation as a whole, and style refers to the manner in which
representatives approach their role, traditionally classified
into trustees and delegates. In practice, the focus and those
two styles are closely related since trustees are more prone
to consider themselves to represent the nation as a whole
and delegates to focus on specific group(s) (e.g. Bengtsson
and Wass, 2011; Wessels and Giebler, 2011).
Due to the seemingly limited impact of styles of repre-
sentation on the behaviour of individual representatives,
studies on those and other role orientations became less
popular in the 1980s but are now appearing again on the
academic agenda (e.g. Bengtsson and Wass, 2011; Blomg-
ren and Rozenberg, 2012a; Wessels and Giebler, 2011).
It is apparent from both the early and recent literature
that there is little consensus about how to define repre-
sentatives’ role-orientation, what terms to use, what best
explains them and their consequences. Many authors have
proposed other terms and definitions than the trustee, dele-
gate and partisan style, such as purposive roles (Wahlke
et al., 1962), position and preference roles (Searing,
1994), and policy representation and interest representation
(Thomassen and Esaiasson, 2006). Rozenberg and Blo-
mgren’s (2012) distinction between legislative and rep-
resentation roles clarifies the subject; legislative roles
are concerned with how representatives organize their
work in the legislative, while representational roles are
about how to represent as the trustee, delegate and parti-
san styles reflect.
Another important distinction exists between the output
and input of styles of representation; the former about the
consequences of different styles and the latter referring to
what explains them. Only if styles of representation explain
a difference in their output is it meaningful to study what
explains their input. While the analysis in this paper
concerns the input, I first discuss research about the conse-
quences of different styles of representation in order to
establish the importance of examining what explains them.
The output of styles of representation
Most studies on the output of representation focus on
whether different styles of representations have different
behavioural or attitudinal consequences at the individual
level (e.g. Andeweg, 2012; Gauja, 2013). It is generally not
presumed that if there are behavioural consequences the
same or similar behaviour can be expected under all cir-
cumstances (e.g. Andeweg, 1997). There are numerous
other factors that could potentially explain how decisions
are made such as party discipline (Kristinsson, 2011) and
the limited number of issues on which representatives can
be experts (Andeweg, 2012). Even if role orientation lacks
explanatory power when studying legislative behaviour,
commonly operationalised as representatives roll-call vote
(e.g. Converse and Pierce, 1986; Kuklinski and Elling,
1977), it could very well explain other behaviours of MPs
such as how they approach their work in parliamentary
committees and, as pointed out by Andeweg (2012), their
interaction and attitudes towards voters.
Using the terms trustees and delegates, adding the role
of politicos, which is between the trustee and the delegate
role (sometimes follow voters and sometimes use own
judgment), Andeweg (2012) finds that delegates in the
Netherlands are in less contact with voters and are more
cynical about them. These findings are contrary to what
might be expected, if it is to be assumed that delegates
should have a more favourable view of voters compared
to trustees and politicos. However, Andeweg’s findings
do show that there is systematic difference related to how
representatives think about their role, even if it is contrary
to what is expected. In the same study, Andeweg shows that
representatives that emphasise that the policy preferences
of voters should be incorporated into their party’s policy
(bottom-up representation) are in more contact with voters
while representatives who favour elite-driven party politics
(top-down representation) have more frequent contact with
ministers and officials to discuss the problems of individual
citizens.
O¨nnudo´ttir (2014) establishes that styles of representa-
tion do explain policy congruence as the outcome of repre-
sentation between parties and their voters. She shows that
parties with a high number of partisans have lower policy
congruence with party voters compared to parties with a
high number of trustees who have higher policy congruence
with their voters. Her findings repudiate the RPM, which
assumes that adhering to the prevailing party policy is the
optimal way for representatives to represent the voters of
their party; who should have voted for the party that is
closest to their own policy preferences. These findings do
call for an explanation of why parties differ in their
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emphasis on styles of representation, which is the subject of
this paper.
The input of styles of representation
An important feature of the trustee, partisan and delegate
styles is that those are about how representatives think
about their representational role and what source(s) they
use, or claim to use, when making decisions. Under the
trustee style, the source for decision making is the represen-
tative themselves, under the partisan style it is the party
policy and under the delegate style the source is the voters.
Considering this main difference, it is reasonable to
hypothesise that there are different factors linked to each
source that encourage different styles within parties. When
the source for decision making is the party, as in the parti-
san style, characteristics of that source should explain
whether the partisan style is prevailing within parties. The
very same goes for the promotion of the delegate style; in
that case, the characteristics of the voters of each party
(party voters) may explain a high or a low proportion of
delegates within parties. When those factors are absent,
parties have more flexibility to promote the trustee style
which is the only one where the source for decision making
is not a collective. However, as elaborated on below, I
argue that parties’ representation in government promotes
the trustee style within parties along with the absence of the
abovementioned factors.
The effect of the institutional setting of the political and
electoral system on political representation has received
considerable attention (e.g. Golder and Stramski, 2010;
Wessels, 1999; Wessels and Giebler, 2011). Those studies
that focus exclusively on representatives’ role-orientation
commonly include one country or a handful of countries
(e.g. Costa et al., 2012; Ilonski, 2012; Saalfeld, 2007). The
low number of countries means that the effect of the polit-
ical and electoral system can only be speculated on. To this
there are a few exceptions. Wessels (1999) finds that the
smaller the district magnitude the more both European and
national MPs focus on their constituency. Farrell and
Scully (2010) show that as electoral systems become more
open, with greater flexibility for voters to indicate a prefer-
ence for certain candidates, the more prone elected repre-
sentatives in the European Parliament (EP) are to focus
on their constituency. More recently, Wessels and Giebler
(2011) find that the higher the chance candidates for the EP
consider themselves to have of getting elected the less
likely they are to be partisans, indicating that the more
secure the candidates’ election is, the less of a stronghold
their parties hold over them.
The main question in this paper is whether there is a dif-
ference in the emphasis of styles of representation on
the level of parties and party voters. As such, my approach
differs from many earlier studies where the focus is on indi-
vidual representatives or candidates operating within
different parties and under different electoral settings. My
argument is that representation is, at its core, about a collec-
tive representing a collective. Thus it is meaningful to ana-
lyse whether and how different styles of representation are
promoted on the level of those collectives. Due to the past
focus in the literature on what explains individuals’ role-
orientation and the fact that political parties are collectives
made up of individuals, my hypotheses are formulated
based on expectations about how different political context
affects representatives within parties, but focusing on the
party level.
Strøm (2012) casts styles of representation as strategies
representatives use to attain their political goals, whether
that is for example (re-)selection on the party list or (re-)
election. These strategies are conditioned by contextual
factors such as the electoral system and the parties’ charac-
teristics. One obvious contextual factor is the control the
party leaderships’ have over the nomination of candidates.
The greater their control the more likely it would be for rep-
resentatives within those parties to adopt the partisan style
because it increases their chances of advancement for and
within the party, or:
H1: The higher the proportion of party candidates
who are nominated by the parties’ leaderships, the
higher the proportion of partisans within parties.
Zittel (2012) explains styles and focus of representation
in Germany with the main contextual factors as party com-
petition, party socialisation and the mode of the election
(elected via party list or in a single seat district). He finds
that representatives who consider themselves to have a fair
chance of winning and are elected in single member dis-
tricts are more inclined to consider themselves to represent
their district and those who consider it unlikely to win are
more likely to be partisans. Zittel operationalises party
socialisation on the individual level as years of party mem-
bership, party employment in years and for how many years
representatives have held a local or regional party office.
He finds no support for the effect of party socialisation
through these measurements, but finds that younger repre-
sentatives lean more towards the partisan role, perhaps sig-
nalling increasing professionalisation of politics, with
young politicians subscribing to the partisan role as the best
strategic choice for them to advance their careers.
Years of party membership or holding a party office are
not the only means to enhance a political career. Parties’
socialisation effect might manifest itself through the sup-
port needed when competing for public office at the lower
levels of the political system, i.e. the local and/or regional
level. Political careers in public office generally take off at
those lower levels. It is thus rational for representatives on
those levels to gain and maintain the support of party elites
within their districts to enhance their political career (Zittel,
2012). For this reason, I argue and test whether the effect of
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parties’ socialisation on the partisan style manifests itself
through a high number of representatives who have been
elected on the local and/or regional level:
H2: The higher the proportion of party candidates
who have been elected on the local/and or regional
level, the higher the proportion of partisans within
parties.
Strøm (2012) argues that the more a representative is
dependent on his constituents for (re)-election the more
likely s/he is to adopt a role that conforms to the expecta-
tions of her/his constituents. Which style s/he would adapt
to under those circumstances depends on features of the
electoral system and party competition. In addition, it could
also depend on the homogeneity or heterogeneity of the
constituents. The more heterogeneous the policy prefer-
ences of the constituents, the harder it is to advocate the
delegate style because the constituency is highly diverse.
Thus when faced with a group of homogenous voters, the
delegate style is more easily advocated as it does not run
the danger of alienating a group of voters who have differ-
ent preferences.
Rohrschneider and Whitefield (2012) make the point
that parties today are faced with the challenge of competing
for and representing two diverse but roughly equally sized
groups of voters, independent voters and voters who hold a
partisan attachment. This they call the ‘strain of representa-
tion’. They find that party identifiers are closer to their
party on an ideological left-right space and more polarised
in their issue positions compared to independent voters.
Given that party identifiers are more likely to agree with the
issue positions of their party and to take cues from their
party for evaluating policy issues (e.g. Dalton, 2008), it can
be reasoned that those parties who have a high number of
party identifiers among their constituents can more easily
promote the delegate style. I do recognise the tentative
character of my argument and would like to highlight that
my hypothesis below (H3) is explorative:
H3: The higher the proportion of party voters who
identify with a party, the higher the proportion of
delegates within parties.
Rehfeld (2009) argues that historically the trustee style
has three components: aim of decision making; source for
decision making; and responsiveness to sanctions, most
obviously electoral sanctions. Trustees aim for the greater
good in their work, use their own judgement as a source and
are less responsive to sanctions compared to delegates, and
instead act on some form of civic virtue. If it is true that
trustees aim for the greater good, it is plausible to argue that
those parties who have a greater experience in working for
the greater good promote the trustee style. Parties who are
frequently represented in government where they have to
implement collectively binding decisions might be more
used to justifying their decisions as being for the greater
good. Parties’ representation in government can thus
encourage a nation-wide focus of representation, a focus
that is inherent in the trustee style.
A different but related argument is that government-
seeking parties aim to secure enough votes to make them
viable candidates for government. For that, they both have
to secure the votes of their own partisan voters (party iden-
tifiers) and of independent voters. Thus it could be strategi-
cally prudent for those parties to downplay the partisan
style in order not to alienate independent voters and down-
play the delegate style because they want to secure the
votes of both groups. Instead, it is strategically advanta-
geous to promote the trustee style to signal that the party
and its representatives are competent enough to make
informed decisions based on their own judgement, repre-
senting both partisan and independent voters. This is not
meant to predict how elected representatives will behave
once their party is in government. There are many reasons
to believe that individual representatives of government
parties will stick to their party’s positions in their work
as legislators, whether that be factors such as the impor-
tance of securing their government’s majority in parliament
(Kristinsson, 2011) or aspirations to hold onto an executive
position (Mu¨ller, 2000). It is also worth noting that in this
paper I make use of candidate data for measures on styles of
representation and not only elected representatives, who
might reply differently. Instead of limiting my analysis to
elected representatives, it is justifiable to incorporate all
candidates based on the idea that if parties do systemati-
cally promote certain styles of representation that should
be found among all candidates including the elected ones.
Whether it is a socialisation effect as a consequence of
parties’ representation in government or strategically wise
for parties to emphasise the trustee style in order to maxi-
mise their electoral success is an open question. However,
it can be tested whether those two constructs, government-
seeking parties and the proportion of trustees within parties,
go together:
H4: The more often parties have been represented in
government the higher the proportion of trustees w-
ithin parties.
Research design
Data and selection of countries
Data on styles of representation, the proportion of candi-
dates nominated by parties’ leaderships and the proportion
who have backgrounds as elected representatives on the
regional/local level comes from the Comparative Candi-
dates Survey (CCS; www.comparativecandidates.org). The
countries and national elections in the CCS data that
include the variables of interest are the following 10: Bel-
gium 2007, Estonia 2011, Germany 2009, Greece 2007,
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Hungary 2010, Iceland 2009, Ireland 2007, Netherlands
2006, Portugal 2009 and Sweden 2010, covering a total
of 62 parties. In countries where legislatures are bicameral,
only representatives running for the lower house are
included in the CCS and the research is therefore limited
to those.1
Information about parties’ representation in government
comes from the Parliament and Government Composition
Database (ParlGov; www.parlgov.org). Four data sources
are used for the proportion of party identifiers for each
party: the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES;
http://cses.org/datacenter/module3/module3.htm), the Eur-
opean Social Survey (ESS; www.europeansocialsurvey.org),
European Election Studies (EES; www.ees-homepage.net)
and the Irish National Election Study (INES; www.tcd.ie/
ines).2
Response variables: Styles of representation
In the CCS data there are three items that reflect represen-
tatives’ styles of representation. Those three are questions
are about how an MP should vote in parliament if there are
different opinions between:
1. The party position and his/her party voters’ opinion.
2. The constituency voters’ opinion and the MP’s
opinion.
3. The party position and the MP’s opinion.
‘Constituency voters’ and ‘his/her party voters’ are both
referred to as voters in this paper.3 To classify representa-
tives’ style of representation, I use two out of the three
questions for each style. Those who say that the MP should
vote according to the party when contrasted with own opin-
ion and voters in items 1 and 3 are partisans, those say that
the MP should follow the voters’ view in items 1 and 2 are
delegates and those who name the MP in items 2 and 3 are
trustees. The representatives who cannot be categorised
according to this rule are coded as ‘non-classifiable’.
Table 1 lists the proportion of representatives classified
under each style for the 62 parties. It is notable that in 55 of
the parties less than 15% of the candidates are non-
classifiable and in 57 of them less than 20% are. The low
proportion of non-classifiable candidates indicates that
there is a systematic component in their replies that can
be used to categorise them as partisans, delegates or trustees.
At the bottom of the table, a comparison between Eastern
and Western Europe is shown, as well as the total propor-
tions for each style; firstly for the pooled un-weighted data,
secondly weighted by country and thirdly by party. In the
analysis, representatives’ replies are not weighted since the
unit of analysis is at the party level.
Even if the focus in this paper is on party and party vot-
ers’ attributes, it cannot be ignored that there seems to be a
partial difference in main emphasis on styles between
countries. The strong emphasis on the trustee style in Ice-
land and Germany and on the partisan style in Ireland might
be due to the decentralisation of candidate selection in the
two former countries (e.g. Rahat, 2007) and the strong party
discipline in Irish politics (Marsh, 2000). The trustee style
is more common in the two Eastern European countries
compared to the West. However, in Hungary the delegate
role is the one emphasised by most candidates in three out
of four parties, most notably by 73.6% of candidates of Job-
bik, a right-wing populist party. Analysing differences
between countries is beyond the scope of this paper but is
a clear avenue for future research.
For party measures on styles of representation, I use the
proportion of representatives within parties who are either:
1) partisans, 2) delegates or 3) trustees. Representatives
that are non-classifiable are included in the calculation for
the proportion of each style within parties, but not analysed
any further. An example of party measures for the Socialist
Party in Belgium is 37.2 for the proportion of partisans,
14.0 for the proportion of delegates and 34.9 for the propor-
tion of trustees.
Explanatory variables: Parties and party voters
The control of party leadership over who is nominated is
operationalised as the proportion of candidates of a given
party who are nominated by their party’s leadership using
the CCS data and party socialisation from the same data
is the proportion of the parties’ candidates who have been
elected for local and/or regional office (parliament and/or
government). Data from ParlGov is used to construct a
measure on parties’ representation in government. This
measure is the proportion of days the parties have been rep-
resented in government in the past four electoral terms
preceding the election under study in each country. Infor-
mation about the proportion of party identifiers among the
voters of each party is from the third wave of the CSES for
Estonia, Iceland, Germany, Netherlands and Portugal;
from the EES 2009 for Belgium and Greece; from the ESS
2010 for Hungary and Sweden; and from the INES 2007 for
Ireland. For this measure, I use the proportion of party iden-
tifiers among voters (based on vote-recall) for each party.
Control variables
Previous research has established that representatives of
traditional left-wing parties are more likely to emphasise
the partisan style and that representatives of parties from
the centre to right are more likely to emphasise the trus-
tee style (e.g. Damgaard, 1997; Gauja, 2013). To control
for those possible effects, I include two dummies indicat-
ing whether the parties are social democratic/communist/
left parties capturing the traditional left or conservative/
Christian democratic parties who are usually placed from
centre to right. The party codes are retrieved from the
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Table 1. Proportion of partisans, delegates, trustees and non-classifiable within parties.
Partisans Delegates Trustees Non-classifiable N
Belgium
Socialist Party 37.2% 14.0% 34.9% 14.0% 43
Reformist Movement 28.3% 13.0% 32.6% 26.1% 46
Humanist Democratic Center 44.4% 8.3% 33.3% 13.9% 36
Ecolo 47.7% 2.3% 27.3% 22.7% 44
National Front 25.0% 50.0% 20.8% 4.2% 24
Christian Democratic and Flemish 41.7% 14.6% 33.3% 10.4% 48
New-Flemish Alliance 21.4% 35.7% 35.7% 7.1% 14
Socialist Party. Different 57.1% 14.3% 28.6% 0.0% 35
Spirit 62.5% 12.5% 25.0% 0.0% 8
Open Flemish Liberals and Democrats 30.0% 30.0% 30.0% 10.0% 50
Flemist Interest 41.2% 20.6% 29.4% 8.8% 34
Green! 32.1% 12.5% 48.2% 7.1% 56
List-Dedecker 7.5% 52.5% 30.0% 10.0% 40
Estonia
Estonian Center Party 33.3% 11.1% 44.4% 11.1% 9
Estonian Reform Party 32.4% 24.3% 32.4% 10.8% 37
Union of Pro Patria and Res Publica 25.0% 20.0% 45.0% 10.0% 40
Social Democratic Party 14.3% 26.5% 49.0% 10.2% 49
Germany
Social Democratic Party 19.9% 9.3% 56.3% 14.6% 151
Christian Democratic Union 11.5% 9.4% 72.7% 6.5% 139
Christian Social Union 0.0% 4.2% 87.5% 8.3% 24
Free Democratic Party 6.3% 5.6% 77.6% 10.5% 143
Alliance 90 / Greens 4.6% 7.9% 79.5% 7.9% 151
Left Party 13.1% 23.4% 51.8% 11.7% 137
Greece
New Democracy 47.4% 20.5% 23.1% 9.0% 78
Panhellenic Socialist Movement 27.1% 24.3% 40.2% 8.4% 107
Hungary
Fidesz – Hungarian Civic Alliance 27.2% 40.8% 14.3% 17.7% 147
Hungarian Socialist Party 46.2% 26.9% 15.4% 11.5% 52
Jobbik 9.1% 73.6% 14.5% 2.7% 110
Politics Can be Different 7.5% 41.8% 38.8% 11.9% 67
Iceland
Social Democratic Alliance 10.8% 16.2% 58.1% 14.9% 74
Progressive Party 16.9% 7.7% 61.5% 13.8% 65
Independence Party 8.9% 7.1% 73.2% 10.7% 56
Left Green Movement 13.2% 17.6% 52.9% 16.2% 68
Civic Movement 6.3% 25.4% 63.5% 4.8% 63
Ireland
Fianna Fa´il 57.1% 7.1% 14.3% 21.4% 42
Fine Gael 44.4% 8.3% 30.6% 16.7% 36
Labour 47.1% 23.5% 17.6% 11.8% 17
Green Party 53.6% 14.3% 28.6% 3.6% 28
Progressive Democrats 44.4% 11.1% 11.1% 33.3% 9
Sinn Fe´in 66.7% 16.7% 0.0% 16.7% 12
Netherlands
Christian Democratic Appeal 56.7% 0.0% 30.0% 13.3% 30
Labour Party 33.3% 9.5% 47.6% 9.5% 21
Peoples Party for Freedom and Democracy 30.8% 15.4% 46.2% 7.7% 26
Green Left 27.3% 0.0% 72.7% 0.0% 11
Socialist Party 64.0% 0.0% 28.0% 8.0% 25
Democrats 66 22.2% 0.0% 72.2% 5.6% 18
Christian Union 55.6% 0.0% 33.3% 11.1% 9
Political Reformed Party 63.6% 9.1% 27.3% 0.0% 11
Party for the Animals 36.4% 9.1% 27.3% 27.3% 11
(continued)
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Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP; https://manifesto
project.wzb.eu).
Earlier research has also shown that candidate-centred pol-
itics as opposed to party-centred politics encourage represen-
tatives to focus more on their constituency (e.g. Farrell and
Scully, 2010; Norris, 2002). This is quite often operationa-
lised as a distinction between the different ballot structures,
contrasting an open ballot structure with a closed one. Under
a closed ballot structure, voters can only vote one party ticket
and that has been shown to provide incentives for parties to
promote the partisan style (Norris, 2002). In open ballot struc-
tures, voters can either vote directly for a certain candidate or
have the opportunity to rank or indicate their preferred candi-
date, resulting in a greater focus on their constituency (Farrell
and Scully, 2010; Norris, 2002). As such, I include ballot
structure as a control measure in my models contrasting Ice-
land and Portugal, which use a party ballot, with the remain-
ing eight countries that make use of various versions of ballots
where a candidate preference can be or is expressed.4 How-
ever it is noted that the number of countries in this study is too
low to any draw firm conclusions about the effect of the elec-
toral system on styles of representation.
The last control variable introduced here is a dummy for
Estonia and Hungary as former members of the Eastern
European communist regime. The modern party systems
in these countries are younger compared to the other coun-
tries included in this study, and it is still a matter of debate
whether they have stabilised (e.g. Birch, 2001; Dahlmann,
2005; Enyedi, 2006; Ro´bert and Papp, 2012). For that rea-
son, it is possible that the party indicators used in this study
have a different impact on styles of representation in Esto-
nia and Hungary compared to other countries included
here. A table with an overview of all variables used in this
study can be found in Appendix I.
Data analysis
In order to examine how the parties leaderships’ control
over nomination, party socialisation, how often the parties
have been represented in government and the proportion of
party voters who identify with the party, explains styles of
representation, I use Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regres-
sions. The response variables are the proportion of repre-
sentatives within parties who are trustees, partisans or
delegates. The three proportions for style of representation
are not independent of each other; a higher proportion in
one style group is followed by lower proportions in the
other two groups. For that reason, I run separate regressions
Table 1. (continued)
Partisans Delegates Trustees Non-classifiable N
Portugal
Left Bloc 12.2% 39.0% 39.0% 9.8% 41
People’s Party 18.5% 37.0% 33.3% 11.1% 54
Democratic Unity Coalition 52.0% 28.0% 20.0% 0.0% 25
Social Democratic Party 26.5% 22.4% 42.9% 8.2% 49
Socialist 24.0% 16.0% 52.0% 8.0% 25
Sweden
Center Party 38.8% 16.3% 37.8% 7.1% 196
Liberal Party 26.5% 21.8% 38.8% 12.9% 147
Christian Democrats 36.5% 15.1% 38.5% 9.9% 192
Green Party 21.8% 27.4% 42.1% 8.6% 197
Moderate party 46.9% 17.6% 24.6% 10.9% 256
Social Democrats 53.1% 12.5% 24.6% 9.8% 256
Sweden Democrats 60.0% 12.0% 24.0% 4.0% 25
Left Party 39.0% 16.6% 34.2% 10.2% 187
Comparison between Eastern and Western
Europe, weighted by country*
East (Estonia and Hungary) 22.4% 31.2% 35.5% 10.9%
West (Belgium, Germany, Greece, Iceland,
Ireland, the Netherlands, Portugal and
Sweden)
32.0% 40.6% 16.5% 10.8%
Total 29.3% 19.6% 40.6% 10.5% 4200
Weighted by country* 30.0% 20.6% 38.6% 10.8%
Weighted by party** 32.7% 18.5% 38.2% 10.6%
Note: Entries are proportion of candidates assigned to each style of representation. *In the country weight respondents in each country have equal
weight (for example respondents’ replies in Estonia 2011 have the same weight as respondents’ replies in Ireland 2007). **In the party weight
respondents in each party have equal weight (for example respondents’ replies for the Social Democratic Party in Germany 2009 have the same weight
as respondents’ replies for the Left Green Movement in Iceland 2009). Country and party weights are calculated based on the total number of replies to
questions on style divided by the number of countries or number of parties in each scenario.
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for each of the three style groups. The regressions are done
stepwise adding in the first four steps one explanatory vari-
able at a time. In the fifth step I add the control variables for
the type of parties and the ballot structure, and in the sixth I
control for the Eastern European countries. For each style, I
first enter the variables that relate directly to the subject of
my hypotheses, and my discussion focuses on significant
parameters. The parties included are not chosen randomly
and for that reason the significance levels are only mean-
ingful as indicators about the strength of the relationship
between the explanatory variables and the response vari-
ables among the 62 parties included.
My first hypothesis (H1), that the higher the proportion
of candidates who are nominated by the parties’ leadership
the higher the proportion of partisans, is supported in the
full model (Table 2). It is notable that the effect of party
leadership control over nomination is positive for both the
proportion of partisans and delegates once all explanatory
variables have been entered into the calculation, while it
is negative for the proportion of trustees. The relationship
between party socialisation and the proportion of partisans
is as expected (H2); the higher the proportion of represen-
tatives who have a background in local and/or regional pol-
itics, the higher the proportion of partisans. Examining this
for the other two style groups, the direction is the opposite,
but non-significant in the case of the trustee style.
The third hypothesis (H3), that the higher the proportion
of party identifiers among party voters, the higher the pro-
portion of delegates, is supported in the full model, but the
relation is not very strong. The fourth and final hypothesis
(H4) is supported in the full model; the more often a party
has been represented in government, the higher the pro-
portion of trustees within parties. Representation in gov-
ernment has an opposite effect on the proportion of
delegates; the more often parties have been represented
in government the lower the proportion of delegates.
Looking at the other control variables, types of parties
and party ballot structure, the type of parties as operationa-
lised here do not have an impact on the proportions of any
of the three styles of representation, but the party ballot
structure is negatively related with the proportion of parti-
sans. This is contrary to the expectation that a party ballot
structure promotes the partisan style. Due to the low num-
ber of countries in my models, it is meaningless to draw any
firm conclusions here about the effect of the party ballot
structure on the partisan style. The control variable for
Hungary and Estonia is statistically significant in the dele-
gate model, indicating that parties in at least one of those
countries are more likely to contain a high proportion of
delegates.
In Figures 1 to 4, I examine graphically the relation
between the main explanatory variables with each of the
relevant predicted values (unstandardised) for styles of rep-
resentation calculated from the final models (step 6) in
Table 2. This I do both for the total number of parties and
for each country. Figure 1 plots the proportions of candi-
dates who were nominated by the parties’ leaderships as
against the predicted values for the partisan style. The pos-
itive but modest relation (R2¼ 0.12) for the total number of
parties is mainly driven by parties from Belgium, Greece,
Iceland and Portugal. Only in two out of those four, Bel-
gium and Portugal, does the proportion for candidates who
are nominated by their parties’ leadership vary – while in
the other two it does not. In five of the countries the parties’
leaderships do exercise very little or almost no control over
nomination in all or almost all parties (Estonia, Germany,
Iceland, Ireland and Sweden) indicating that for parties in
those countries there are other factors that explain the par-
tisan style. Parties’ socialisation effect has a much stronger
relation to the proportion of partisans (Figure 2) compared
to parties’ leaderships control over nomination. The pro-
portions of candidates who have backgrounds as local
and/or regional representatives have a positive relation with
predicted values for the partisan style in all countries
except Estonia and a strong positive relation among the
total number of parties (R2 ¼ 0.47). This effect is weak
in Greece, a country that together with Estonia makes use
of a strong preferential vote and that could possibly explain
the negligent effect found in those two countries. It could
be that under a candidate centred ballot structure, candi-
dates are prone to downplay the partisan style in order to
distinguish themselves from their competitors. However,
the overall positive trends give ground to the claim that this
effect is independent of other factors such as the electoral
system or different types of parties.
When plotting the proportions of party identifiers
against the predicted values for the delegate style, the
results for each country are mixed, and the explained var-
iance among the total number of parties is almost non-
existent (R2 ¼ 0.04) (Figure 3). Only Belgium and Estonia
show a positive trend, while in the other countries it is
either negative or there is no trend. This indicates that party
identification is neither a strong mover of the delegate style
nor a universal trend. Going back to the regression model in
Table 2, this does not come as a surprise as the proportion
of party identifiers in the parties’ electorates has a weak
relation with the proportion of delegates within parties.
The proportions of parties’ representation in govern-
ment have a positive relation with the predicted values for
the trustee style in all 10 countries, and a modest positive
trend among the total number of parties (R2 ¼ 0.12)
(Figure 4). This gives reason to believe that the effect of
parties’ representation in government on whether the trustee
style is emphasised within parties is independent of other
factors of the political system. It can also be gleaned from
Figure 4 that among those parties who have never been
represented in government there is a high variance in their
predicted values for the trustee style and this deflates the
explained variance among the total number of parties. This
shows that parties’ representation in government is clearly
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not the only factor that encourages the trustee style, but it is
indeed important.
Discussion
In this paper, I have established that the context of political
parties, and to some extent the attributes of party voters, does
indeed matter for the styles of representation emphasised
within parties. I show that there are partly different incen-
tives for the emphasis within parties on each of the three
styles – partisans, delegates and trustees. The wider control
parties’ leaderships have over nomination and the greater the
party socialisation, the more the partisan style is promoted in
parties, with party socialisation weighing more heavily than
party leadership control over nomination. This means that
the success of the highly debated model for representation,
the Responsible Party Model, depends on the parties’ control
over their candidates’ career paths.
A high proportion of party identifiers in the parties’
electorates is modestly but positively correlated to the pro-
portion of delegates within parties. This could be so
because party identifiers of a given party are more homoge-
neous and in greater agreement with the parties’ policies
compared to independent voters. In those cases, parties
could promote the delegate style because it is ‘easier’ to
advocate the idea that the party voters’ opinions should
prevail when party voters are homogeneous. This may even
apply more to parties who run on a single-issue platform or
a populist right-wing platform. In the case of single-issue
parties the ‘will of the voters’ is more clearly signalled
compared to in parties who run on a wider platform. Popu-
list parties might be more prone to emphasise the delegate
style because the message of that style, that decisions
should be based on the ‘will of voters,’ fits the populist
platform; referring to the will of the people and justifying
their actions by appealing to and identifying with the peo-
ple (e.g. Jagers and Walgrave, 2007).
The trustee style is more common among government-
seeking parties. This may be because representatives of those
parties have been socialised into the trustee style as through
their work they should aim for the greater good. It is also pos-
sible that government-seeking parties promote the trustee style
as a response to the ‘strain of representation’ outlined by
Rohrschneider and Whitefield (2012). Parties that are faced
with the challenge of representing both independent voters and
those who identify with the party might be more prone to
emphasise the trustee style as a strategy to maximise their elec-
toral success. On a related note, party leadership control over
nomination reduces the likelihood of the trustee style. It can be
argued that a decentralised nomination process, where candi-
dates’ nominations are dependent on selectors other than their
parties’ leaderships, not only creates greater flexibility to
Figure 1. Predicted values for the partisan style and parties’ leaderships’ control over nomination.
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Figure 2. Predicted values for the partisan style and party socialisation.
Figure 3. Predicted values for the delegate style and the proportion of party identifiers in the parties’ electorates.
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adopt the trustee style but also encourages it. Under such a pro-
cess, a strategic way for competitors to secure their nomination
is to signal that they are more competent than their competitors
to represent their party and can be trusted to make informed
decisions and are thus socialised into the trustee style. This
could of course depend on the electoral system, with
candidate-centred systems more likely to encourage the trus-
tee style.
It is clear from my results that the way representatives of
different parties think about how MPs should treat their man-
date is related to and conditioned by their parties’ attributes
and to some extent the attributes of their voters. My results
have several implications for the understanding of how rep-
resentation works in modern democracies. Considering that
parties offer different policies and that voters have heteroge-
neous policy preferences, I have shown that it is reasonable
to frame the representational link as the link between parties
and their voters. What criterion parties’ representatives
claim to use to make decisions once in office revolves
around their understanding of how they should treat their
mandate; whether they are elected to carry out their party’s
policy, follow the will of their voters or use their own jud-
gement when making decisions. There is, however, more
to this story. Given that a politician’s ultimate goal is
either to be a representative or to contribute to their
party’s electoral success, specific contextual factors that
condition their or their party’s election can encourage dif-
ferent styles of representation. This can be the case
whether these are their parties’ or party voters’ attributes
as established here, or the setting of the electoral system.
To conclude, my results show that the context of polit-
ical parties and party voters is important for the promotion
of styles of representation within parties. A country com-
parison shows that the effects of party identifiers and party
leadership control over nomination is different between
countries, while the effects of party socialisation and party
representation in government are more consistent. The
mixed results found between countries underlines the
importance of a more detailed theorising and analysis of
how those factors differ both between political systems
and different types of parties, taking into account for
example the different degrees of an open ballot structure,
decentralisation of the nomination process, competition
within parties and party types. One of the contributions
of this paper is that it provides the groundwork for such
a detailed analysis. It also shows how the different charac-
teristics of the representatives and of those they represent
explain the difference in emphasis between parties on
representational styles. Those styles are about how to rep-
resent which is a crucial element of representation.
Figure 4. Predicted values for trustee style and the proportion of parties’ representation in government.
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Notes
1. This applies to Belgium 2007.
2. Preferably all measures for party identification should have
been retrieved from election study data where voters are asked
as close as possible to the same election as covered in the CCS
data. That data was not available for Belgium 2007, Greece
2007, Hungary 2010 and Sweden 2010 when this paper was
written. For Belgium and Greece I use the EES data from
2009 which was two years after the general elections covered
in the CCS for those countries. For Hungary and Sweden I use
the ESS 2010 data that covers the same election as in CCS data
from the same year for those two countries. Data on party vot-
ers for other countries are retrieved from the CSES and INES
covering the same election as the CCS data and carried out
immediately after the election under study.
3. Even if there is a difference in terminology about voters
between questions 1 and 2, the former asking about ‘‘his/her
party voters’’ and the latter about ‘‘constituency voters’’, both
are contrasted with either the party position or the MP’s own
opinion. For that reason it is meaningful to apply the delegate
role to those who name voters in questions 1 and 2 and contrast
them with partisans and trustees.
4. Information about the electoral systems is retrieved from the
Ace Project (www.aceproject.org) and the Inter-Parliamentary
Union (www.ipu.org).
Supplementary material
Appendix I contains a table for all variables used in this paper.
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Appendix
Partisans Delegates Trustees
Candidates
who
are nominated
by the party
leadership
Candidates
who have
background
as elected
local and/or
regional
representatives
Days in
government
in the
last four
electoral
terms
Party
identifiers
among
the
party’s
voters
Party types:
SD/C ¼
Social
democratic/
soc./
Communist,
C/CH ¼
Conservative/
Christian
democratic
Belgium
Socialist Party 37.2% 14.0% 34.9% 54.5% 79.5% 100.0% 55.0% SD/C
Reformist Movement 28.3% 13.0% 32.6% 83.3% 81.3% 40.0% 62.0% Other
Humanist Democratic
Center
44.4% 8.3% 33.3% 69.2% 74.4% 65.0% 45.0% C/CH
Ecolo 47.7% 2.3% 27.3% 14.0% 50.0% 20.0% 68.0% Other
(continued)
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Appendix. (continued)
Partisans Delegates Trustees
Candidates
who
are nominated
by the party
leadership
Candidates
who have
background
as elected
local and/or
regional
representatives
Days in
government
in the
last four
electoral
terms
Party
identifiers
among
the
party’s
voters
Party types:
SD/C ¼
Social
democratic/
soc./
Communist,
C/CH ¼
Conservative/
Christian
democratic
National Front 25.0% 50.0% 20.8% 66.7% 19.2% 0.0% 67.0% Other
Christian Democratic
and Flemish
41.7% 14.6% 33.3% 70.0% 47.1% 65.0% 64.0% C/CH
New-Flemish Alliance 21.4% 35.7% 35.7% 40.0% 33.3% 0.0% 69.0% Other
Socialist Party.
Different
57.1% 14.3% 28.6% 91.9% 73.0% 100.0% 68.0% SD/C
Spirit 62.5% 12.5% 25.0% 70.0% 40.0% 0.0% 80.0% SD/C
Open Flemish Liberals
and Democrats
30.0% 30.0% 30.0% 64.7% 57.7% 40.0% 41.0% Other
Flemist Interest 41.2% 20.6% 29.4% 80.0% 77.1% 0.0% 63.0% Other
Green! 32.1% 12.5% 48.2% 44.3% 47.5% 20.0% 59.0% Other
List-Dedecker 7.5% 52.5% 30.0% 61.0% 14.6% 0.0% 33.0% Other
Estonia
Estonian Center Party 33.3% 11.1% 44.4% 0.0% 100.0% 23.0% 69.0% Other
Estonian Reform Party 32.4% 24.3% 32.4% 0.0% 83.8% 82.0% 35.0% Other
Union of Pro Patria
and Res Publica
25.0% 20.0% 45.0% 0.0% 90.0% 55.0% 40.0% C/CH
Social Democratic
Party
14.3% 26.5% 49.0% 0.0% 77.6% 31.0% 26.0% SD/C
Germany
Social Democratic
Party
19.9% 9.3% 56.3% 0.0% 71.7% 57.0% 56.0% SD/C
Christian Democratic
Union
11.5% 9.4% 72.7% 0.0% 68.8% 42.0% 56.0% C/CH
Christian Social Union 0.0% 4.2% 87.5% 0.0% 45.5% 42.0% 53.0% C/CH
Free Democratic Party 6.3% 5.6% 77.6% 0.0% 53.5% 21.0% 30.0% Other
Alliance 90 / Greens 4.6% 7.9% 79.5% 0.0% 61.5% 36.0% 40.0% Other
Left Party 13.1% 23.4% 51.8% 0.0% 36.2% 0.0% 48.0% SD/C
Greece
New Democracy 47.4% 20.5% 23.1% 87.5% 53.8% 15.0% 54.0% C/CH
Panhellenic Socialist
Movement
27.1% 24.3% 40.2% 89.6% 49.7% 78.0% 70.0% SD/C
Hungary
Fidesz – Hungarian
Civic Alliance
27.2% 40.8% 14.3% 22.9% 82.5% 27.0% 70.7% Other
Hungarian Socialist
Party
46.2% 26.9% 15.4% 3.8% 67.3% 76.0% 70.1% SD/C
Jobbik 9.1% 73.6% 14.5% 41.5% 14.7% 0.0% 66.3% Other
Politics Can be
Different
7.5% 41.8% 38.8% 17.4% 7.2% 0.0% 45.5% Other
Iceland
Social Democratic
Alliance
10.8% 16.2% 58.1% 6.3% 32.0% 15.0% 49.0% SD/C
Progressive Party 16.9% 7.7% 61.5% 8.3% 30.3% 93.0% 46.0% Other
Independence Party 8.9% 7.1% 73.2% 6.0% 37.0% 98.0% 73.0% C/CH
Left Green Movement 13.2% 17.6% 52.9% 1.7% 29.6% 9.0% 48.0% Other
Civic Movement 6.3% 25.4% 63.5% 0.0% 1.3% 0.0% 13.0% Other
Ireland
Fianna Fa´il 57.1% 7.1% 14.3% 0.0% 69.2% 85.0% 52.0% C/CH
Fine Gael 44.4% 8.3% 30.6% 0.0% 84.2% 21.0% 35.0% C/CH
(continued)
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Appendix. (continued)
Partisans Delegates Trustees
Candidates
who
are nominated
by the party
leadership
Candidates
who have
background
as elected
local and/or
regional
representatives
Days in
government
in the
last four
electoral
terms
Party
identifiers
among
the
party’s
voters
Party types:
SD/C ¼
Social
democratic/
soc./
Communist,
C/CH ¼
Conservative/
Christian
democratic
Labour 47.1% 23.5% 17.6% 0.0% 50.0% 32.0% 28.0% SD/C
Green Party 53.6% 14.3% 28.6% 0.0% 85.7% 0.0% 17.0% Other
Progressive
Democrats
44.4% 11.1% 11.1% 0.0% 66.7% 74.0% 9.0% Other
Sinn Fe´in 66.7% 16.7% 0.0% 0.0% 41.7% 0.0% 26.0% Other
Netherlands
Christian Democratic
Appeal
56.7% 0.0% 30.0% 64.5% 61.3% 48.0% 33.0% C/CH
Labour Party 33.3% 9.5% 47.6% 15.8% 50.0% 51.0% 36.0% SD/C
Peoples Party for
Freedom
and Democracy
30.8% 15.4% 46.2% 32.0% 65.4% 100.0% 34.0% Other
Green Left 27.3% 0.0% 72.7% 9.1% 66.7% 0.0% 36.0% Other
Socialist Party 64.0% 0.0% 28.0% 12.5% 88.0% 0.0% 12.0% SD/C
Democrats 66 22.2% 0.0% 72.2% 0.0% 44.4% 69.0% 31.0% SD/C
Christian Union 55.6% 0.0% 33.3% 16.7% 55.6% 0.0% 42.0% C/CH
Political Reformed
Party
63.6% 9.1% 27.3% 61.5% 69.2% 0.0% 62.0% Other
Party for the Animals 36.4% 9.1% 27.3% 84.6% 0.0% 0.0% 6.0% Other
Portugal
Left Bloc 12.2% 39.0% 39.0% 25.0% 42.9% 0.0% 35.0% SD/C
People’s Party 18.5% 37.0% 33.3% 44.9% 55.4% 0.0% 36.0% C/CH
Democratic Unity
Coalition
52.0% 28.0% 20.0% 8.3% 36.0% 0.0% 46.0% SD/C
Social Democratic
Party
26.5% 22.4% 42.9% 57.4% 80.0% 23.0% 52.0% SD/C
Socialist 24.0% 16.0% 52.0% 34.6% 79.3% 62.0% 53.0% SD/C
Sweden
Center Party 38.8% 16.3% 37.8% 1.6% 80.2% 14.0% 85.5% Other
Liberal Party 26.5% 21.8% 38.8% 3.0% 77.2% 14.0% 72.9% Other
Christian Democrats 36.5% 15.1% 38.5% 3.4% 80.1% 14.0% 74.4% C/CH
Green Party 21.8% 27.4% 42.1% 3.1% 76.3% 0.0% 71.2% Other
Moderate Party 46.9% 17.6% 24.6% 6.1% 86.3% 14.0% 84.9% C/CH
Social Democrats 53.1% 12.5% 24.6% 5.9% 88.8% 43.0% 78.1% SD/C
Sweden Democrats 60.0% 12.0% 24.0% 38.5% 56.5% 0.0% 73.1% Other
Left Party 39.0% 16.6% 34.2% 1.1% 81.4% 0.0% 69.1% SD/C
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Policy Congruence and Style of
Representation: Party Voters and
Political Parties
EVA H. ÖNNUDÓTTIR
This article focuses on whether styles of representation inﬂuence policy congruence.
Style of representation is deﬁned at the party level as the proportion of representatives
within parties who are partisans, delegates or trustees. Policy congruence refers to how
close on the left–right scale the mean position of a party as placed by its candidates is
compared to that of party voters. The article concludes that where there are higher pro-
portions of trustees within parties, there is a greater degree of policy congruence,
whereas a higher proportion of partisans results in less policy congruence. The propor-
tion of delegates has no signiﬁcant impact on congruence after taking account of other
party and country measures. This indicates that party constraints on representatives are
applied at the cost of congruence with voters, and that when representatives enjoy more
ﬂexibility to follow their own opinions, the party displays greater congruence with its
own voters.
It is common for the nature of political representation to be analysed separately
from its outcomes (Andeweg and Thomassen 2005). In this article, I combine
these strands. Studies on the outcome of representation have frequently focused
on whether the opinions and voting behaviour of MPs in a given parliament
reﬂect the policy preferences of their voters on the left–right spectrum, referred
to as policy congruence. The nature of representation refers to the role of the
representative, in particular whether a representative can be classiﬁed as a
delegate, a trustee or a partisan. A delegate takes instructions from voters
regardless of his own opinion, a trustee makes his own decisions based on
deliberation of the issues under question and a partisan follows the party’s lead
when making decisions.
Earlier studies, such as Andeweg’s (2012), using the trustee versus delegate
typology to assess whether representatives’ roles determine their behaviour
once elected, have shown a weak impact. Andeweg establishes that Esaiasson
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and Holmberg’s (1996) typology of bottom-up representation (the will of the
voters should be decisive) versus top-down representation (the will of the
political elite should be decisive), explains representatives’ behaviour only
slightly better. However, as Andeweg points out, the results are, in some cases,
quite contentious. The expectation that representatives who favour bottom-up
representation should be more inclined to have faith in voters’ ability to take
decisions is not conﬁrmed. On the contrary, those representatives tend towards
greater cynicism about citizens compared to those who favour top-down repre-
sentation. Andeweg points out that limited empirical support and controversial
results indicate that there is still considerable need for further theoretical and
empirical research about the consequences of representational roles.
Earlier studies on congruence have, more often than not, been suggestive
of a causal connection between representatives and the represented (Dalton
1985; Leimgruber et al. 2010; Schmitt and Thomassen 2000; Valen and Narud
2007). However, they have often been conﬁned to single countries or single
elections, relying on different measures for representation, different explanatory
factors and/or diverse analytical levels (Achen 1977; Bengtsson and Wass
2011; Leimgruber et al. 2010; Schmitt 2010; Wessels and Giebler 2011). The
question as to whether or not proportional electoral systems facilitate more
congruence as against majoritarian systems has recently been shown to be less
relevant than it has been historically (Powell 2009). This indicates one or both
of the following: that the motivations for policy congruence between parties
and voters have changed, and/or that the effect of the electoral system on
policy congruence is intermingled with the attributes of voters and parties. It is
the latter notion that is under study here; that is to say, whether the proportion
of representatives within parties who are delegates, trustees or partisans
explains policy congruence. Other party attributes included as explanatory
factors for policy congruence are party size, party age and the frequency of a
party’s representation in government.
In the literature on policy congruence, it is generally assumed that voters
will be better represented when they are closer to their representatives
(Converse and Pierce 1986; Rosema et al. 2011). Wessels and Schmitt (2008)
make the point that the wider and more numerous the policy options are from
which voters can choose, and the closer the ﬁt between the electorate and their
voting options, the more meaningful their vote. The literature on policy
congruence implicitly supports the idea that it is delegates that are most likely
to be congruent with voters, because they follow instructions from voters in
their work as representatives. However, this does not have to be the case.
Strøm (2012) points out the importance of distinguishing between roles and
preferences, where roles are not necessarily identical to, or determined by,
preferences. Another distinction is policy choice, meaning the decisions made
on policy. In the literature on styles of representation, it is not of major
concern whether the policy preferences of representatives are close to those of
voters. Even if the role of the delegate assumes that representatives should
follow voters’ instructions in their policy choice, it is not necessarily the case
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that their policy preferences are close to those of voters. The same argument
applies to the partisan role; under this, it is assumed that policy choice should
be guided by the position of the party and not the policy preferences of voters
or individual representatives. It is only for trustees that policy preferences and
policy choices come from the same source, where individual representatives
claim to follow their own policy preferences in their policy choices.
The suggestion that delegates are not necessarily closest to voters on policy
preferences, as against trustees and partisans, allows for the possibility that
either of the latter two may be. Fox and Shotts (2009) discuss how voters pri-
oritise competence and congruence, and theorise that when voters prefer com-
petence, they provide electoral incentives for representatives to take on the role
of a trustee. They also theorise that when congruence is high, the trustee role
is encouraged, because representatives will then have to compete on skill rather
than congruence. However, the causal mechanism could be the inverse; when
trustees are successful in signalling their competence to voters, that success
engenders trust, and trust produces congruence. In either case, higher propor-
tions of trustees within parties should lead to more congruence between the
parties and their voters.
Strøm (2012) argues that representatives’ roles are the ones they believe to
be most suited to allow them to achieve their goals, whether that is to secure
nomination on the party list, to secure their own or their party’s election,
secure a party ofﬁce or secure a legislative ofﬁce. Representatives whose goals
are constrained, regulated or mediated by their party are more likely to take on
a partisan role. It can thus be expected that partisans are more dependent on
their party to reach their goals, and are thus are more congruent with their own
party compared to trustees and delegates. If voters are generally closer to the
centre on policy preferences when compared to parties, it is expected that a
higher proportion of partisans within parties spawns less congruence between
parties and their voters.
Assuming that a closer ﬁt between voters and their options indicates a more
meaningful democracy, it is worth examining how style of representation affects
congruence between parties and party voters. The causal direction could also be
the reverse – that high or low congruence produces different incentives for repre-
sentatives to take on certain roles. However, I assume that policy congruence,
deﬁned as how close parties are to the policy preferences of voters, is a common
denominator between voters and parties regardless of different political incen-
tives and motivations. In this sense, policy congruence as the outcome of repre-
sentation reﬂects the extent to which parties represent their voters.
Outcome of Representation
A common factor in examinations of policy congruence from a country-com-
parative perspective is the left–right orientation of parties and voters. The
left–right position of parties and voters is the most widespread cross-sectional
indicator available, although it may not be as powerful a determinant of the
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vote as it has been (Hellwig 2008). With increasing de-alignment, performance
voting, and particularly increasing ideological depolarisation (Green 2007; van
der Eijk et al. 2005), it is quite plausible that the left–right position is not as
signiﬁcant as it has been historically in reﬂecting congruence between parties
and their voters.
Notwithstanding these considerations, the left–right position is still mean-
ingful as it symbolically unites representatives and the represented (Belchior
2011). Van der Eijk and Schmitt (2010) illustrate that voters’ perceptions of
the left–right position of parties are associated with the policy content of elec-
toral manifestos. They also ﬁnd that this compatibility between perceptions and
manifestos continues even if the salient issues change over time within and
between countries. This indicates that left–right position is still meaningful as
a measure of policy congruence.
Golder and Stramski (2010) demonstrate how different measures of policy
congruence yield different results, emphasising the well-known dictum that the
measure should be guided by the goal of the research. They also point out the
importance of how congruence is conceptualised – for example whether the
focus is on congruence between all voters and the government (many to one),
or whether it is on congruence between all members of the parliament and all
voters (many to many). They ﬁnd that majoritarian systems produce higher
policy congruence between citizens and the government, and proportional sys-
tems a higher congruence between citizens and the parliament. Golder and
Stramski focus on the link between all citizens and either the parliament or the
government. An alternative approach is the partisan-constituency model, which
emphasises the link between the party and its supporters (Ezrow 2010).
Rohrschneider and Whiteﬁeld (2012) use the latter approach to examine how
attributes of the electorate relate to policy congruence. They establish the
importance of accounting for the number of de-aligned voters in the examina-
tion of policy congruence, and the extent to which that interacts with the insti-
tutional setting of the electoral system. Irrespective of the electoral system,
they ﬁnd that the higher the proportion of independent voters in parties’ con-
stituencies, the less congruence it has with its voters compared to parties who
have a high proportion of partisan voters.
The research presented here falls within the partisan-constituency model, as
in Rohrschneider and Whiteﬁeld’s study. The main difference is that party attri-
butes are examined, i.e. the styles of representation, as explanatory factors for
policy congruence, as opposed to voters’ attributes.
Nature of Representation
Earlier studies on the nature of representation focused on individual MPs and
their voters, not on political parties or all candidates running for a particular elec-
tion (Eulau and Karps 1977; Eulau et al. 1959; Miller and Stokes 1963). The
focus on individual MPs is in part explained by the historical development of
political theory, originating from Burke’s classiﬁcation of individual legislators
4 E. H. Önnudóttir
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as either trustees or delegates, and in part by the fact that many earlier studies on
representation originated in the US, where political parties are weaker than in
Europe (Dalton 1985). Dalton (1985) points out that in modern party systems,
the focus should be more on the bond between political parties and voters than
on individual MPs and voters. In line with this, Converse and Pierce (1986) add
the partisan role to those of trustee and delegate in their study of political repre-
sentation in France. Representatives in modern party systems have to take into
consideration not only their own and their voters’ opinion, but also the position
of the party they are representing.
The responsible party model (RPM) (APSA 1950) is an attempt to capture
the three-way bond between representatives, voters and parties. The main idea
is that representatives are partisans who take cues and instructions from their
parties about how to decide on issues. For political representation to be effec-
tive, voters must have a choice between two or more parties where at least two
parties offer different policy programmes. RPM assumes that voters have pol-
icy preferences, that they are aware of the policy preferences of the parties and
that they vote according to their own policy preferences. For representation to
work, parties should have sufﬁcient discipline to be able to implement their
respective policy programmes. In this way, RPM is very demanding for both
voters and representatives (Wessels and Giebler 2011) and it has not been suc-
cessful in explaining why political representatives do not always follow the
position of their party (Esaiasson and Holmberg 1996; Valen and Narud 2007).
In their study on parties running for the European Parliament Wessels and
Giebler (2011) ﬁnd that party control over the nomination of candidates does
not produce congruence between candidates and their party, as the full imple-
mentation of RPM demands. However, they do establish that the role orienta-
tions of candidates are relevant to representation since they relate to policy
congruence within parties in a systematic way. They ﬁnd that partisans1 are
closer to their own party on the left–right scale as compared to non-partisans,2
conﬁrming that RPM is at least partly relevant in explaining party politics.
Observed deviations from RPM indicate that it is less of a formal theoreti-
cal framework and more of a practice of representation (Aldrich 1995; Wessels
and Giebler 2011). Aldrich (1995) discusses political parties as endogenous
institutions created, maintained and altered by politicians. Parties are a means
for politicians to realise their own goals, whether that is to get elected, stay in
ofﬁce or to indirectly implement their policy preferences as party members. At
the same time, parties constrain politicians in their actions, as they have to fol-
low the party’s rules and traditions.
The expectation is that partisan representatives are ofﬁce-seekers, as
deﬁned by Aldrich (1995). Strøm (2012) adds that representatives aiming for
an ofﬁce or a status determined by their party are more likely to be partisans.
Because of their ambition, they stick to the position of their party, as it is the
fastest route to a political career, and maintain it within and for the party.
Representatives aiming for an ofﬁce that is not determined by their party will
take on roles other than the partisan one, if they believe it may help them to
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reach their goal. In line with this, it can be assumed that representatives who
want to signal their own competence to the party and voters take on the role
of a trustee when they consider that role to be the best one for them as a strat-
egy to reach their goal. The same strategy should also motivate delegates, who
emphasise that voters’ opinions should prevail over their own or their parties’
opinions.
Policy Congruence and Style of Representation
In this section I ﬁrst discuss what to expect of delegates, trustees or partisans
regarding how congruent they are as individuals with their own party before
discussing styles of representation as party attributes and their consequences
for policy congruence between parties and their voters.
The main concern in the debate on representational roles is about how dif-
ferent roles are linked to tasks, functions and behaviour, and what factors moti-
vate representatives (Strøm 2012). The focus is on the mechanisms
representatives use to arrive at decisions, and whether their role choice has any
consequences for their behaviour as elected representatives (Andeweg 2012).
Fox and Shotts (2009) treat congruence as the ﬁt between the policy
choices of elected representatives and the policy preferences of their voters,
which is consistent with much of the literature. Of key importance here is
how representatives make choices. Their own policy preferences are either
of secondary importance, as in the delegate or the partisan role, or the rep-
resentatives’ policy choice and policy preference come from the same
source as in the trustee role. If congruence is measured as behavioural
rather than attitudinal, as is done here, then it should be expected that dele-
gates’ policy choices are closer to voters’ preferences compared to trustees
and partisans. However, as the delegate role assumes only that their policy
choice is in line with voters, and not necessarily the delegates’ policy pref-
erences, there is no apparent reason why they should be more congruent on
policy preferences (attitudinal) with voters as compared to trustees or parti-
sans. On this basis, I hypothesise that the proportion of delegates within
parties has no effect on congruence between parties and party voters, as
outlined and measured in this article:
H1: The proportion of delegates within parties has no effect on the con-
gruence of policy preferences between parties and party voters.
It can be assumed that representatives aiming for positions that are controlled or
mediated by their party function as partisans, and assign importance to the party
position over their own or voters’ opinions. Taking on the partisan role is an
effective strategy to secure a seat high enough on the party list to have a chance
of getting elected, and of staying in ofﬁce. Partisans are therefore expected to
be the ones who are closest to their own party on policy. It can be assumed that
6 E. H. Önnudóttir
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parties with a high proportion of partisans also have strong party discipline.
Given that party discipline is strong, the party leadership should have greater
ﬂexibility to position the party on ideology as the leadership prefers. Assuming
that the policy preferences of voters are in general more centrist than those of
politicians and parties, I expect that the higher the proportion of partisans within
parties the less congruent they are with their voters:
H2: The higher the proportion of partisans there are within parties the
less congruence of policy preferences there is between parties and party
voters.
Andeweg (2011) suggests that voters today prefer their MPs to act as trust-
ees who follow their own instincts as long as they are able to solve the
problems they are faced with in their political work. Parties with a high
proportion of trustees should have weaker party discipline than parties with
a high number of partisans. Thus, the leadership in parties with a high pro-
portion of trustees do not have the same ﬂexibility to place their party on
the left–right scale and have to compromise with other party members. That
should result in the party positions being closer to the centre and therefore
closer to its voters (assuming that voters are more centrist). According to
Fox and Shotts (2009), the electoral success of representatives who signal
that they are competent enough to use their own judgement for policy-mak-
ing is dependent on voters preferring competence over congruence. The
more importance voters place on competence, the greater incentive there is
for representatives to adopt the trustee role. They establish that the role of
a trustee is most likely to be encouraged when representatives are highly
congruent with voters because then representatives have to compete on skill
instead of congruence. Fox and Shotts imply that the main causal mecha-
nism comes from the voters’ side; that it is the preferences of voters that
determine whether the trustee or delegate role is encouraged. However, this
causality could be the inverse, or be mutually reinforcing. Trustees, who are
successful in signalling their competence by their past work as politicians,
provide incentives for the electorate to trust them. That trust can engender
congruence between representatives and the represented. In this two-way
relationship between style of representation and congruence, I expect that
parties’ initiatives to weigh more heavily than the voters’, because in gen-
eral it is parties who lead and voters who follow (Holmberg 2011). Thus, I
hypothesise that policy congruence between parties and voters should be
greater when the party has a high proportion of trustees:
H3: The higher the proportion of trustees there are within parties the
more policy congruence there is between parties and party voters.
Party Voters and Political Parties 7
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Research Design
As I am using individual-level data as aggregates for party attributes, I ﬁrst
look at descriptive data for representatives’ style of representation before mov-
ing to an analysis at the party level. However, I start out by describing the
data, selection of countries and measurements. Classiﬁcations of all party vari-
ables used in this article are covered in Appendix I.
Data and Selection of Countries
In this article, I combine parties and party voters in pairs referred to as party
dyads. Using party dyads as the unit of analysis is based on the fact that politi-
cal parties are major players in modern democracies, particularly in political
systems where people vote for parties and not individual representatives (Dal-
ton 1985; Holmberg 1997; Valen and Narud 2007). The main data sources
used in this article are the Comparative Candidate Survey (CCS) for candi-
dates, and the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) and European
Election Study (EES) for voters. Measures on style of representation retrieved
from the CCS data cover nine countries and 56 parties at the national level.
The nine countries and election years are: Australia 2007, Belgium 2007, Ger-
many 2009, Greece 2007, Iceland 2009, Ireland 2007, Netherlands 2006, Por-
tugal 2009 and Switzerland 2007.
For policy congruence, I use the left–right position of parties as placed by
candidates in the CCS data and the self-placement of voters on the left–right
scale from the CSES and EES data. Voters’ left–right self-placement is avail-
able for seven out of nine countries in the CSES data, covering the same elec-
tions as the CCS data for those countries.3 The policy position of voters from
the two remaining countries, Belgium and Greece, is retrieved from the EES
study that was carried out in 2009, two years after a general election in both
countries. Candidates’ data and voters’ data are linked to the political party the
voter cast his vote for and to the political party the candidate represents in the
election under study.4 Throughout the study, I use the term ‘representatives’
interchangeably with ‘candidates’, when referring to actual or potential repre-
sentatives for their respective party.
My analysis only includes parties that were elected to parliament, for three
reasons. First, the focus of the study is on the representational bond that
becomes active once a party is elected. By excluding non-represented parties, I
still include an overwhelming majority of voters, as the 56 parties cover
around 80 per cent of the national vote, with the lowest vote share (79.9 per
cent) being for the two Greek parties (New Democracy and Panhellenic Socia-
list Movement) (see Appendix I). Second, indicators of interest are not avail-
able for all non-represented parties5 and non-represented parties are excluded
from the candidate studies in some countries.6 Third, in the voter data there is
in most cases a small-n problem for parties that did not get elected, thereby
making the indicator for voters’ left–right self-placement in those cases
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unreliable. In countries where parliaments are bicameral (upper and lower
house) only parties that were running for the lower house are included in the
CCS and the research is therefore limited to those.7
Policy Congruence
For policy congruence between parties and party voters, I calculate the abso-
lute distance between the mean of the party representatives’ placement of their
party on the left–right scale and the mean self-placement of party voters.8 Low
ﬁgures reﬂect closer links between parties and voters, and therefore high policy
congruence. High ﬁgures reﬂect parties and voters that are further apart and
therefore low policy congruence. Using two different data sources (one for vot-
ers and one for representatives) prevents the danger of assimilation or contrast
effects found in studies using the same data source, such as voters’ self-place-
ment and voters’ placement of parties. Assimilation is when respondents pull
their preferred party closer towards them on the left–right spectrum, while a
contrast effect is when they push non-preferred parties further away from their
own position (Drummond 2010). A more serious bias caused by endogeneity
is theoretical; that it is congruence itself that promotes certain styles of repre-
sentation but not the inverse, as is argued here. As I am using discrete data
(one time-point for each country) I cannot test the direction of causality empir-
ically. I have addressed this issue theoretically earlier in this article and return
to it in the discussion at the end.
Van der Eijk (2001) argues that using the mean to determine policy posi-
tion could cause error, as it does not capture the different dispersions around
the mean within each group that is compared, and instead the interpolated
median is a more appropriate measure for congruence.9 Another option for a
measure of policy congruence that captures dispersion on the left–right scale is
to use Andeweg’s (2011) measure, which is similar to Golder and Stramski’s
(2010) measure. Both use a measure for policy congruence which compares
the number of agreements on each point of the scale.10 The higher the number
of agreements between voters and parties on the left–right scale, the more pol-
icy congruence there is. For the purposes of this article, the absolute difference
between the means is used for congruence measures. However, I do run the
regression analysis presented later in this article, using each of the alternative
measures of congruence discussed here and list the results in Appendix II. All
nine models, except one, yield similar results as when using the difference
between the absolute means.11
Style of Representation
In the CCS data there are three questions that reﬂect style of representation.
The questions concern how an MP should vote in parliament if there are differ-
ent opinions between:
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(1) Party position and his/her party voters’ opinion.
(2) Constituency voters’ opinion and MP’s opinion.
(3) Party position and MP’s opinion.
For simplicity, I refer to both ‘constituency voters’ and ‘his/her party vot-
ers’ as ‘voters’.12 I assume that representatives’ style of representation is
that which they believe to be optimal for them to achieve their goal. In this
sense, I assume that their replies to the three questions above are sincere
and reﬂect their role orientation. However, I do not assume that their replies
reﬂect how they would actually behave when faced with conﬂicting opin-
ions, because there are numerous factors other than representational roles
that affect the actual policy choices of representatives. Those factors include
party discipline (Kristinsson 2011) and the limited number of issues in
which one representative can effectively invest sufﬁcient time to become
master (Andeweg 2012).
For the categorisation of representatives’ style into partisans, delegates and
trustees, I use two out of three questions for each style group. Those represen-
tatives who say that the MP should follow the party position when in conﬂict
with voters or the MP’s opinion are classiﬁed as partisans. Those who say that
the MP should follow his own opinion when in conﬂict with the party position
or the voters’ opinion are considered trustees. Delegates are those who say that
the MP should follow the voters’ opinion when in conﬂict with the party posi-
tion or the MP’s opinion.
Table 1 lists the proportion of representatives in each of the three style
categories and those that are non-classiﬁable for each party in the candidate
data. It is notable that in 40 out of the 56 parties less than 15 per cent of
the candidates are non-classiﬁable, and in 46 of them less than 20 per cent
are non-classiﬁable. The low proportion of non-classiﬁable candidates indi-
cates that there is, in general, a systematic component that allows for the
classiﬁcation of trustees, partisans and delegates according to candidates’
replies to the three questions about how an MP should decide. At the bot-
tom of the table, the total proportions for each style are shown ﬁrstly for
the pooled un-weighted data, secondly weighted by country and thirdly by
party.13
For the purpose of this article, representatives’ replies are not weighted
since the unit of analysis is the party level. For party measures on style of
representation, I use the percentage of representatives within parties who are
(1) delegates, (2) partisans or (3) trustees. Representatives that are non-clas-
siﬁable are included in the calculation for the proportion of each style
group within parties, but not analysed any further. To take an example of
party measures for the Liberal Party of Australia, it is 19.0 for the propor-
tion of delegates, 39.7 for the proportion of partisans and 27.0 for the pro-
portion of trustees.
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TABLE 1
PROPORTION OF PARTISANS, DELEGATES, TRUSTEES AND NON-CLASSIFIABLE
WITHIN PARTIES
Delegate
(%)
Partisan
(%)
Trustee
(%)
Non-classiﬁable
(%) N
Australia 2007
Liberal Party of Australia 19.0 39.7 27.0 14.3 63
Australian Labor Party 16.9 60.2 14.5 8.4 83
National Party of Australia 70.0 0 30.0 0 10
Belgium 2007
Socialist Party 14.0 37.2 34.9 14.0 43
Reformist Movement 13.0 28.3 32.6 26.1 46
Humanist Democratic Center 8.3 44.4 33.3 13.9 36
Ecolo 2.3 47.7 27.3 22.7 44
National Front 50.0 25.0 20.8 4.2 24
Christian Democratic and Flemish 14.6 41.7 33.3 10.4 48
New-Flemish Alliance 35.7 21.4 35.7 7.1 14
Socialist Party. Different 14.3 57.1 28.6 0 35
Spirit 12.5 62.5 25.0 0 8
Open VLD 30.0 30.0 30.0 10.0 50
Flemish Interest 20.6 41.2 29.4 8.8 34
Green! 12.5 32.1 48.2 7.1 56
List Dedecker 52.5 7.5 30.0 10.0 40
Germany 2009
Social Democratic Party 9.3 19.9 56.3 14.6 151
Christian Democratic Union 9.4 11.5 72.7 6.5 139
Christian Social Union 4.2 0 87.5 8.3 24
Free Democratic Party 5.6 6.3 77.6 10.5 143
Alliance 90 / Greens 7.9 4.6 79.5 7.9 151
Left Party 23.4 13.1 51.8 11.7 137
Greece 2007
New Democracy 20.5 47.4 23.1 9.0 78
Panhellenic Socialist Movement 24.3 27.1 40.2 8.4 107
Iceland 2009
Social Democratic Alliance 16.2 10.8 58.1 14.9 74
Progressive Party 7.7 16.9 61.5 13.8 65
Independence Party 7.1 8.9 73.2 10.7 56
Left Green Movement 17.6 13.2 52.9 16.2 68
Civic Movement 25.4 6.3 63.5 4.8 63
Ireland 2007
Fianna Fáil 7.1 57.1 14.3 21.4 42
Fine Gael 8.3 44.4 30.6 16.7 36
Labour Party 23.5 47.1 17.6 11.8 17
Green Party 14.3 53.6 28.6 3.6 28
Progressive Democrats 11.1 44.4 11.1 33.3 9
Sinn Féin 16.7 66.7 0 16.7 12
Netherlands 2006
Christian Democratic Appeal 0 56.7 30.0 13.3 30
PvdA Labour Party 9.5 33.3 47.6 9.5 21
People’s Party for Freedom and
Democracy
15.4 30.8 46.2 7.7 26
Green Left 0 27.3 72.7 0 11
Socialist Party 0 64.0 28.0 8.0 25
Democrats 66 0 22.2 72.2 5.6 18
(Continued)
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Other Party Characteristics (Age, Size and Representation in Government)
Other party attributes, aside from style of representation, that are considered in
relation to policy congruence between parties and party voters are party size,
party age and the frequency of parties’ representation in government.
Dahlberg (2009) suggests that voters’ agreement on party policy should be
lower for catch-all parties than cadre parties, due to a higher variance of their
policy positions. Attributes of catch-all parties, according to Kirchheimer
(1990), are their large size and vague ideological proﬁle. Based on this, party
size is included, and thus testing for whether policy congruence between bigger
parties and voters is lower compared to smaller parties. Party size is measured
as the parties’ share of MPs in the parliament after the election under study.14
Party age can be expected to inﬂuence policy congruence as older parties
could have a clearer policy position than younger and less established parties
(Dahlberg 2009). Older parties have had a longer time to establish themselves
and mobilise voters. The variable on party age15 included is the number of
years since the party was ﬁrst elected to parliament.16 A similar logic can be
applied to the representation of parties in government as for party age. Since
TABLE 1 (Continued )
Delegate
(%)
Partisan
(%)
Trustee
(%)
Non-classiﬁable
(%) N
Christian Union 0 55.6 33.3 11.1 9
SGP Political Reformed Party 9.1 63.6 27.3 0 11
Party for the Animals 9.1 36.4 27.3 27.3 11
Portugal 2009
Left Bloc 39.0 12.2 39.0 9.8 41
People’s Party 37.0 18.5 33.3 11.1 54
Democratic Unity Coalition 28.0 52.0 20.0 0 25
Social Democratic 22.4 26.5 42.9 8.2 49
Socialist 16.0 24.0 52.0 8.0 25
Switzerland 2007
Christian Democratic People’s Party 19.2 8.4 49.3 23.2 203
Radical – Democratic Party 13.3 12.4 56.4 17.9 218
(Swiss) People’s Party 16.3 18.3 42.8 22.6 208
Social Democratic Party 7.5 16.5 57.1 18.8 266
(Swiss) Green Party 7.6 4.2 65.3 22.9 262
Liberal Party 14.3 0 38.1 47.6 21
(Protestant) Evangelical People’s
Party
9.2 4.6 63.8 22.4 152
Total – pooled data 14.6 20.5 50.2 14.7 3725
Total – weighted by country⁄ 16.3 30.3 41.2 12.2
Total – weighted by party⁄⁄ 16.1 29.7 41.1 13.1
Note: Entries are proportion of candidates assigned to each style of representation. ⁄In the country
weight respondents in each country have equal weight (for example respondents’ replies in Switzer-
land 2007 have the same weight as respondents’ replies in Ireland 2007). ⁄⁄In the party weight
respondents in each party have equal weight (for example respondents’ replies for the Social Dem-
ocratic Party in Germany 2009 have the same weight as respondents for the Left Green Movement
in Iceland 2009). Country weight and party weight are calculated based on the total number of
replies to questions on style divided by the number of countries or number of parties in each
scenario.
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governing parties generally secure a greater amount of media coverage, they
could have a clearer policy position as perceived by voters, compared to
opposition parties. Governing parties can also be expected to be closer to their
voters on policy, as their electoral success may be inﬂuenced by the possibility
that they are actually closer to their voters than parties with less electoral suc-
cess. As a measure of parties’ representation in government, I use the propor-
tion of days the parties have been represented in government in the four
electoral terms preceding the election under study in each country.17
Data Analysis
Next, I examine how style of representation affects policy congruence between
parties and party voters on the level of parties, taking into account party size,
party age and parties’ representation in government, using bivariate correlation
matrix and Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression. When examining the
effect of the styles of representation on policy congruence, positive correlations
and Beta coefﬁcients indicate that the higher the proportion of the style in
question, the higher is the ﬁgure for policy congruence; indicating that parties
and party voters move further apart (distance grows). Negative correlations and
Beta coefﬁcients indicate that a higher proportion of the style is followed by
lower ﬁgures on policy congruence; parties and their voters move closer
together (distance shrinks).
Initial analysis is performed using Pearson R correlations to establish
whether there is a difference in policy congruence between parties and party
voters depending on style of representation and other party attributes (Table 2).
In order to determine the robustness of the results, I perform this analysis
twice; ﬁrst with all 56 parties and then dropping parties with fewer than 30
responses from candidates (18 parties have fewer than 30 respondents, with the
lowest number of respondents being nine for a single party). The correlations
are robust in all cases, with the exception of the correlation between the pro-
portion of partisans and policy congruence, which is not signiﬁcant when the
analysis is limited to parties with a minimum of 30 responses. Nevertheless,
the direction of the correlation is the same in both instances, which justiﬁes
the use of all 56 party dyads in the remaining analysis in this article.
The bivariate correlations in Table 2 indicate that style of representation is
correlated to policy congruence between parties and party voters. Contrary to
hypothesis H1, which stated that the proportion of delegates within parties has
no impact on policy congruence, the bivariate correlation indicates that it does
indeed have an impact. The higher the proportion of representatives within par-
ties who are delegates, the lower the congruence between parties and party vot-
ers. The bivariate correlations support my other two hypotheses regarding the
impact of the proportion of partisans (H2) and trustees (H3) on policy congru-
ence. The higher the proportion of partisans within parties, the lower is policy
congruence. The relationship is the inverse for trustees; the higher the propor-
tion of trustees within parties, the higher the congruence between parties and
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party voters. Of the other party attributes, party size does not correlate with
policy congruence, but party age and the frequency of parties’ representation
in government do show correlations. The greater the age of the party, and the
more often it has been represented in government, the higher is the policy con-
gruence between parties and party voters.
Next, I test my three hypotheses in a full OLS regression model, including
measures on style of representation, other party measures and control measures
for institutional settings of the political systems. Obviously, there is a small-n
problem, with only 56 party dyads. Moreover, the three proportions for style
of representation are not independent of each other. A higher proportion in one
style group is followed by lower proportions in the other two groups. For that
reason, I run three OLS regressions, one for each of the three style groups. I
drop party size from the analysis as it does not correlate with policy congru-
ence (Table 2), but keep party age and frequency of parties’ representation in
government in the model. Here, there is a potential central tendency among
voters that needs to be controlled for. This would show higher congruence
between parties and party voters in the middle of the left–right spectrum. To
control for this, I include polarisation on the left–right scale between the mean
party voters and the mean country voter.17
An interaction coefﬁcient between party age and frequency of parties’
representation in government is added to the model, as parties that ﬁrst enter
parliament in one of the four electoral terms before the current election have
not had the same opportunity to be represented in government as older parties.
The effect of parties’ representation in government could therefore be depen-
dent on the age of the party.
Two country-level variables are included in the OLS regression as control
measures: the number of effective parliamentary parties and polarisation of the
party system. The number of effective parliamentary parties can affect parties’
policy placement if it is assumed that the more numerous parties are, the more
likely they are to spread out across the ideological spectrum. As a measure of
the number of effective parties, I use relative seat share of parties in the parlia-
ment.18 On a related note, polarisation of the party system can affect congru-
ence between parties and party voters to a similar degree as the number of
effective parties. The difference is that polarisation of the party system captures
the dispersion of the party system on the left–right scale – not only the number
and relative weight of parties.19 Each regression analysis is done stepwise,
including ﬁrst only the party measures on style of representation and, in the
second step, adding the other explanatory variables.
Table 3 presents the results of the regressions. With references to my three
hypotheses, they are all supported in the full model. The proportion of dele-
gates does not explain variance in policy congruence when controlling for
other party and country measures (H1). The proportion of partisans does
explain variance in policy congruence: the higher the proportion of partisans,
the less policy congruence there is (H2). The relationship is the opposite for
trustees, with a higher proportion associated with more policy congruence
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between parties and party voters (H3). The bivariate correlations from Table 2,
between other party attributes and policy congruence between parties and party
voters, are also conﬁrmed by the regression analysis. Party age explains vari-
ance in policy congruence to the extent that congruence is higher in older par-
ties across all three models. The frequency of parties’ representation in
government is associated with higher policy congruence only when the party
has a high proportion of either trustees or delegates.
Concluding Remarks
The research presented here contributes to the existing body of knowledge by
combining the nature and outcome of representation in a single study analysing
these factors in a country-wide comparative perspective. I establish that style
of representation and the proportion of partisans and trustees relates to policy
congruence between parties and party voters, at least for the 56 parties
included in this study. The lack of impact of the proportion of delegates and
the effect of the proportion of partisans and trustees with policy congruence is
as expected. When a party has a high proportion of partisans, congruence as
measured here is lower between parties and party voters. When a party has a
TABLE 3
OLS REGRESSION, DETERMINANTS OF POLICY CONGRUENCE BETWEEN PARTIES
AND PARTY VOTERS (N = 56 PARTY DYADS)
Standardized Beta
Coefﬁcients
Standardized Beta
Coefﬁcients
Standardized Beta
Coefﬁcients
Party variables:
% of partisans 0.35⁄⁄
% of delegates 0.21
% of trustees –0.43⁄⁄
R2 0.12 0.04 0.18
Party variables:
% of partisans 0.31⁄
% of delegates -0.02
% of trustees –0.35⁄
Party age –0.53⁄⁄ –0.53⁄⁄ –0.55⁄⁄
Representation in government
(%⁄100)
–0.50+ –0.64⁄ –0.43
Polarisation, voters (mean party voter
– the mean country voter)
0.28⁄ 0.29⁄ 0.21+
Interaction; party age⁄representation in
government
0.54 0.68+ 0.48
Country variables:
Effective number of parliamentary
parties
–0.08 –0.01 –0.04
Polarisation of the party system –0.07 –0.27⁄ –0.04
R2 0.49 0.42 0.50
Change in R2 signiﬁcant 0.000 0.000 0.000
Note: Dependent variable is policy congruence between parties and party voters, measured as the
absolute distance on the left-right scale between the mean placement of party by its candidates and
the mean self-placement of voters. Signiﬁcant coefﬁcients are in bold ﬁgures. Signiﬁcance levels:
+p < 0.1; ⁄p < 0.05; ⁄⁄p < 0.01; ⁄⁄⁄p < 0.001. Program: SPSS 20. N=56 party dyads.
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high proportion of trustees, it has more congruence with its voters. Party age
also explains policy congruence; older parties show higher congruence between
parties and party voters.
Even if the delegate role assumes that representatives’ policy choices
should be close to voters, it does not assume that their policy preferences
should be close. Treating policy congruence as attitudinal – that is to say, how
close parties are to voters on policy preferences – results in no impact of the
proportion of delegates on congruence after taking account of other party attri-
butes and characteristics of the party system. This underlines the importance of
separating policy preferences from policy choice, when examining the impact
of style of representation on the outcome of representation, measured as con-
gruence between policy preferences. It is surprising that when looking at a
bivariate correlation between the proportion of delegates and congruence the
relationship is both positive and signiﬁcant, indicating that a higher proportion
of delegates are followed by lower policy congruence. This relationship disap-
pears in the full model after controlling for other party- and country-level vari-
ables. Whether this holds true if the number of units (party dyads) is increased
is beyond the scope of this article, but is a clear avenue of future research to
build upon.
Parties with a high proportion of partisans seem to be pulled away from
their voters. Representatives choose the partisan role when they state they
would follow the party’s policy, even when and if it deviates from the repre-
sentatives’ own opinion or the voters’ views. My results contradict the respon-
sible party model, which assumes that sticking to the party position is the best
way to represent voters who have voted for the party’s policy; a policy that
should be closest to the voters’ own preferences, according to RPM. Even
more controversial for RPM is that parties with a high proportion of trustees
are actually closer to voters compared to parties with a high proportion of
partisans.
In line with Andeweg’s (2011) suggestion, if voters today prefer their rep-
resentatives to act as trustees – i.e. as long as they are competent enough to
deal with the policy problems they are faced with – parties that have a high
proportion of competent trustees should encourage voters to trust them, and
this trust could engender congruence between parties and their voters. It is also
possible that there is a systemic component inﬂuencing where representatives
place their respective parties, depending on party discipline. Strong party disci-
pline encourages representatives to take on the partisan role if they want to
maintain a political career within their party. Strong party discipline should
also result in more ﬂexibility for the party leadership to place their party closer
towards the ends of the left–right spectrum, away from the bulk of voters who
place them closer to the centre, resulting in lower congruence between the
party and its voters. Trustees could have a tendency to place their party closer
to the centre of the left–right spectrum because they do not have the same con-
straints as partisans to follow party policy and for that reason parties with a
high proportion of trustees are more congruent with their voters.
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My argument is that style of representation impacts on policy congruence
between parties and party voters. However, I cannot exclude the possibility that
high or low congruence produces different incentives for representatives to take
on certain roles. If that is indeed the case, I argue that the relation is bi-direc-
tional, and that parties’ incentives, such as style of representation, weigh more
heavily compared to voters’ incentives. It is possible that low congruence with
voters encourages representatives to take on the partisan role. If the gap
between the party and voters is perceived to be wide, its representatives cannot
argue that they are following the will of voters and they shift over to the pol-
icy of the party as a justiﬁcation of policy choices. If congruence is perceived
to be high, representatives could be encouraged to promote the trustee role,
since they are already close to voters on policy, and they have to establish that
they are sufﬁciently skilled in order to solve the policy problems with which
they are faced. However, in this mutually reinforcing relationship, I argue that
the style of representation weighs more heavily, assuming that parties are the
leading actor in the partnership between parties and voters.
A research lead to take from here would be to examine congruence on more
speciﬁc issues, including the salience of those issues in the voters’ minds and
how competent they consider the available parties are to deal with those issues.
The effect of style of representation might be different if the focus is on single
issues such as environmental protection or nationalistic issues. Another possible
avenue of research would be to consider Rohrschneider and Whiteﬁeld’s (2012)
study on how congruence is higher when a party has a higher number of partisan
voters as opposed to independent voters, and examine to what extent parties’
style of representation interacts with such voters’ attributes.
The focus in this study has been on attitudinal factors as reﬂected in styles
of representation and congruence between the policy preferences of parties and
their voters. I do acknowledge that MPs might (and probably will) behave dif-
ferently when they are faced with an actual choice between conﬂicting opin-
ions. However, establishing that there is a link between styles of representation
and congruence between policy preferences of parties and voters, as has been
demonstrated here, indicates that style of representation is meaningful for the
outcome of representation.
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Notes
1. Wessels and Giebler label them as ‘party delegates’.
2. Wessels and Giebler group trustees and delegates together and contrast them with partisans.
3. CSES module 3 covers Australia 2007, Ireland 2007, Netherlands 2006, Germany 2009, Ice-
land 2009, Portugal 2009 and Switzerland 2007.
4. In the EES study, voters were asked about what party they voted for in the previous election.
In both countries, Greece and Belgium, the previous election was the 2007 election also cov-
ered in the CCS data.
5. This applies to the candidate data from Portugal 2009, Germany 2009 and Ireland 2007.
6. This applies to the candidate data from Greece 2007, Iceland 2009 and the Netherlands 2006.
7. This applies to the candidate data from Australia 2007, Belgium 2007 and Switzerland 2007.
8. The formula for policy congruence using the means is: LRDPm = |Vm – Pm|. LRDPm is the
absolute left–right distance between the mean placement of party by its candidates and the
mean self-placement of party voters, Vm is the mean left–right placement of party voters and
Pm is the mean left–right placement of the party as placed by its candidates. The scales for
left–right are on an 11-point scale, ranging from 0 (left) to 10 (right).
9. The interpolated median takes account of the number of respondents that choose each layer
on the congruence measure, in our case the left–right position. The interpolated median is
computed as follows: IM = M + (ng – nl) / (2ne), IM is the interpolated median, M is the
standard median, nl is the number of responses less than M, ng the number of responses that
are greater than M and ne is the number of responses equal to M. The distance measure is
calculated using the same formula as computing the distance between the means (see note 8);
<AQ4> replacing the mean with the interpolated median.
10. Andeweg uses a non-cumulative function, while Golder and Stramski use a cumulative func-
tion. See discussion on this in Andeweg (2011: 43).
11. The one exception is that the coefﬁcient for the proportion of partisans is non-signiﬁcant
when policy congruence is measured as the absolute difference between the interpolated medi-
ans; in all other models it is signiﬁcant and positive.
12. There is a semantic difference between questions 1 and 2, when asking voters’ opinions. The
response category to the ﬁrst question refers to the MP’s own party voters, and the second to
constituency voters. However both are contrasted with either the party position or the MP’s
own opinion. I assume that the responses reﬂect a difference between a bottom-up process as
the role of delegate assumes, and a top-down process inherent in the role of partisans and
trustees. Based on that I take those together who choose voters in question 1 and 2 as dele-
gates and contrast them with partisans and trustees.
13. Weighing the data by country or by party results in an increase in partisans, a slight increase
in delegates and a drop in trustees. The difference between the un-weighted and weighted
replies, and the harmonisation between the replies when weighted by country or by party,
could indicate that there is a country difference in representatives’ replies to the questions
about the role of the MPs.
14. Information on the size of the parties in parliament is from the macro-data codebooks in the
CSES study for all elections except the Greek and Belgian elections in 2007. Information on
the size of Belgian and Greek parties is retrieved from Patrikios and Karyotis (2008) for
Greece and from Pilet and van Haute (2008) for Belgium.
15. Various sources for party age are used, such as party websites, Wikipedia.org and macro-data
codebooks from the CCS project. National experts have, in all cases, been asked to conﬁrm
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the coding for party age. National experts are: Rachel Gibson and Ian McAllister (Australia),
Lieven de Winter and Pierre Baudewyns (Belgium), Hermann Schmitt (Germany), Theordore
Chadjipadelis (Greece), Eva Heida Onnudottir and Olafur Th. Hardarson (Iceland), Michael
Marsh (Ireland), Dorien van Rheenen (Netherlands), André Freire (Portugal) and Georg Lutz
(Switzerland).
16. Another possibility would be to use the number of years since the party was founded. How-
ever, there can be problems in pin-pointing the exact year for when the parties were founded,
as well as mergers and splits of parties before they ﬁrst enter the parliament. Whilst these
problems can also occur when using the year the party ﬁrst enters the parliament, I believe
this is a more reliable measure. Most importantly, it should be found that party age is related
to policy congruence; older parties should have higher policy congruence with their voters
compared to younger parties.
17. Information on the number of days parties have been represented in government is from the
Parliament and Government Composition Database (2011).
18. The absolute difference between the mean party voter and the mean country voter.
19. Formula used is: Number of effective parliamentary parties = 1/∑((proportion of seats in the
parliament)2).
20. Polarisation of the party system is calculated using the following formula from Dalton
(2008): SQRT {∑(party vote sharei)
⁄([party L–R scorei – party system average L–R score]/
52}, where i represents individual parties and L–R stands for left–right. For the parties’ L–R
means, I use the candidates’ placement of their own party from the CCS data.
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Abstract 
This paper combines the nature and outcome of representation by analysing how different 
styles of representation emphasised within parties explain party voters’ evaluations of the 
performance of liberal democracy in their country, using for parties the Comparative 
Candidates Survey and for voters the European Social Survey 2012. Styles of representation 
are defined at the party level as the proportions of representatives within parties who are 
partisans, delegates or trustees. The results show that the more the trustee style is emphasised 
within parties, the more positively the performance of liberal democracy is evaluated. The 
relation for the delegate style is inverse; the more that style is emphasised, the more 
negatively democratic performance is rated, while the effect for the partisan style is 
negligible. It is argued that trustee parties are those who gain from the current political 
system, and are able to mobilise voters who evaluate liberal democracy positively, as 
opposed to voters of delegate parties which are less satisfied and evaluate democratic 
performance more negatively.  
  
Keywords: Styles of representation, political parties, party voters, party dyads and 
performance of democracy. 
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Introduction 
One of the distinguishing features of representative democracy is the electoral linkage 
where voters on the demand side of democracy choose their representatives on the supply 
side of democracy (Castiglione and Warren 2006: 6). This paper combines those two sides by 
analysing how party characteristics in modern democracies explain party voters’ evaluations 
of the performance of liberal democracy in their countries. Political parties are key actors in 
the intermediation of interests and policy preferences in modern democracies (Mair 2006: 
12), and thus it is meaningful to examine whether there is a link between the structure and 
make-up of parties and their voters’ evaluations of liberal democracy. 
Furthermore, this paper combines two main concepts which are generally theorised 
about and analysed separately in studies of representation, and those are the nature and 
outcome of representation (Andeweg and Thomassen 2005: 507). The nature of 
representation concerns the relationship between representatives and the represented, while 
outcome is about how representation manifests. Nature of representation as how to represent, 
using here styles of representation, divided into partisan, trustee and delegate styles, is linked 
both to normative and practical debate about democracy (Blomgren and Rozenberg 2012: 4-
5). These styles are about, inter alia, what criteria elected representatives should use for 
decision making—whether they should use their own judgement as trustees, whether they 
should follow their respective party’s policy as partisans or whether they should follow the 
will of voters as delegates.  
Complicating this debate is that democratic representation is, by its nature, a 
collective representing a collective (Castiglione and Warren 2006: 12-13). The individual-
level focus is limited when it comes to understanding and analysing the demand and the 
supply sides of representation together, the dyadic link between the represented and those 
who represent (Schmitt and Thomassen 2000: 321). The content and the form of this link is 
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disputed, both due to different ideas about how representation ought to work, as the three 
styles of representation, trustee, partisan and delegate styles reflect, and due to differences in 
expectations of democratic representation. Considering the outcome of representation, it is 
debated whether parties do represent their voters on policies and/or issues (e.g. Hooghe et al. 
2002: 973-976), which can be labelled as objective outcome of representation. Party voters’ 
evaluations of the performance of their political regime can be considered as a subjective 
outcome of representation, reflecting how content they are with the state of affairs in their 
political system. Different expectations about democracy is of importance when it comes to 
understanding how supportive people are of their political system. Those who prioritize 
means of democracy (such a free and fair election) over its ends (such as policy 
responsiveness) have been found to be more likely to support the incumbent government 
compared to those who prioritise the ends of democracy over its means (e.g. Baviskar and 
Malone [2004: 14-15]; Fuchs [1999: 142-45]). This highlights that those who expect more of 
democracy in terms of what it delivers seem to hold the political authorities to a higher 
standard and underlines the importance of taking into account the differences in expectations 
about democracy.  
As pointed out by Easton (1975b: 436), evaluations of democratic performance are 
one of the foundations for support for the political system. The question asked here is 
whether differences in evaluations of the performance of liberal democracy manifests in the 
electoral linkage between parties and their voters. More specifically the question is whether 
party voters evaluate the performance of their democracy differently depending on the extent 
to which the trustee, partisan or delegate styles are emphasised within the party they voted 
for, and if so, why? Implicit in these questions is whether the nature of representation has 
consequences for its outcome; and this is a largely unexplored field in studies about 
representation. The main findings are that when the trustee style is prevalent within parties, 
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voters of those parties evaluate the performance of liberal democracy more positively, voters 
of delegate parties evalaute it negatively and the relation is negligent for partisan parties. 
These findings could reflect that trustee parties are those who gain the most from the current 
political system and thus manage to attract voters who have a favorable view of the 
performance of the system, while it is the other way around for delegate parties. By 
combining the demand and supply side together in one study, I follow Easton’s (1973; 7-8) 
notion, which assumes that each part of the larger political whole is related to one another or 
as in his words: “…the operation of no one part can be fully understood without reference to 
the way which the whole itself operates” (7-8).  
For my case, I use 72 party dyads, constituting of party voters and political parties 
who gained representation in 11 elections in Europe in the 2000s (Belgium 2007, Denmark 
2011, Germany 2009, Finland 2011, Hungary 2010, Iceland 2009, Ireland 2007, the 
Netherlands 2006, Portugal 2009, Sweden 2010 and Switzerland 2011). In the following 
sections I first discuss the theoretical background of my study, both in what mobilises voters’ 
evaluations of the performance of liberal democracy in their country, and what mobilises 
different styles within parties. The next section after that discusses the dyadic link between 
parties and their voters and the hypotheses tested in this paper. After that I move on to the 
description of the research design, data and measurements, followed by analysis of the data 
and a discussion.  
Evaluations of liberal democratic performance  
The term ‘political support’ was introduced by Easton (1973: 14-15) as an important 
concept for the legitimacy of the political regime, the political community and the political 
authorities. Easton argued that political support is on a continuum from diffuse support for 
the political regime to specific support for the authorities. Building on Easton’s framework, 
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Norris (1999b: 9-13) argues that it ranges from support for the political regime to support for 
political actors, with three levels in between—regime principles, regime performance and 
regime institutions. Support for the political regime is about attachment to the nation as a 
community. Regimes’ principles concern the values of the political system, or in the case of 
modern democracies, support for democracy as the legitimate system of governance. Support 
for regime performance is about the performance of the political system. On the level of 
regime institutions, support concerns the authorities, such as the government and the 
legislative bodies, and support for political actors refers to support for the politicians 
themselves.  
The distinction between the different levels of support indicates that people can 
express high support for one or some levels and low for others (e.g. Dalton 1999: 74-77). 
However, as pointed out by Easton (1975a: 16), the distinction between different levels of 
support does not mean that they are fully independent of one another. It is generally found in 
modern democracies that support for the political regime and principle is high, while support 
for its performance or incumbent authorities varies (e.g. van Ham and Thomassen 2014: 10-
13). The widespread diffuse support is usually interpreted as a support for the democratic 
system—and an indicator of its legitimacy being in good shape. At the same time fluctuations 
or changes in support with how it is implemented, its performance and political actors, are 
interpreted as ‘support for’ and not as indicators about how legitimate the political system is 
or is perceived to be. However, it has repeatedly been suggested (e.g. Magalhães [2014a: 
92];Norris [1999a: 264-68]) that a long-term dissatisfaction and low support towards the end 
of specific support might consequently undermine support towards the diffuse end of the 
continuum of political support. 
Voters’ evaluations of the performance of their democracy can be considered as 
important foundations for their support on the level of regime performance (Gómez and 
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Palacios [2016: 157-158]; Easton [1975b: 436]). Different explanations for what mobilises 
support on this level have been, for example, the cognitive mobilisation of citizens (Dalton 
2006: 262-64), perceptions and/or levels of corruption (Kubbe [2013: 117]; Stokemer and 
Sundstrøm [2013: 137]), and institutional effectiveness of the political system (Norris 2011: 
116). An analysis of data from the European Social Survey 2012 shows that while Europeans 
widely share a liberal view of democracy, most notably emphasising the rule of law and free 
and fair elections as indispensable for democracy (Hernández 2016: 63). However, there are 
differences in how demanding they are of democracy, as for example democracy in terms of 
social justice and the use of elements of direct democracy (Kriesi et al. 2016: 86-87). Using 
the same data, Ceka and Magalhães (2016: 109-110) establish that those who are privileged 
are more likely to defend the status quo of their current political and institutional system, 
while the underprivileged are more likely to endorse a change. In both new and old 
democracies, high social status citizens (in terms of education) are less supportive of social 
justice in the sense of redistributive policies, compared to low social status individuals. In 
new democracies, where liberal democracy is weaker compared to older ones, and in 
countries that do not make use of direct democracy, high social status individuals are less 
supportive of both liberal and direct democracy. Ceka and Magalhães argue that these 
differences are due to that low social status individuals have more to gain to from changes in 
the system, while high status individuals are content with it as it is. Torcal and Trechsel 
(2016: 217-224), using the same data, establish that those who place higher importance on 
liberal democracy are also more likely to evaluate it positively, and that this effect is more 
pronounced among those who voted for an incumbent government party in the last election. 
In their analysis, party identifiers, are also more likely to evaluate liberal democracy more 
positively compared to those who do not identify with a party, and this they say confirms the 
importance of party supply and its proximity to citizens’ preferences. This could also mean 
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that supporters of the status quo, including party identifiers, are those who evaluate the 
performance of liberal democracy more positively and are more likely to vote for political 
parties that represent and gain from the current political system. Using almost an identical 
scale for evaluations of the performance of liberal democracy (explained in more details in 
the section ‘Research design’), I test whether party voters’ evaluate the performance in their 
countries differently depending on the extent of which different styles of representation are 
emphasised within their parties. 
Styles of representation 
Since the early days of representative studies, two dominant models of representation 
have been widely disputed, the trustee versus delegate model and the political parties model 
(Thomassen 1994: 237). The former refers to the mandate-independence controversy, 
whether elected representatives should behave as trustees and follow their own judgement 
when making decisions or act as delegates following the will of voters (e.g. Eulau and Karps 
1977: 242-43). The political party model, also referred to as the Responsible Party Model 
(RPM) (e.g. Thomassen 1994: 251-52), adds the role of the partisan, which are those who 
emphasise that their party’s policy should be decisive in decision making. Both those models 
have been criticised for being both unrealistic and outdated. However, the fact that those are 
still quite dominant in studies on representation (e.g. Andeweg [2012: 65-69]; Fox and Shotts 
[2009: 1225]) reflects that, even if not without flaws, they touch upon core elements of 
democratic representation—about whom and how to represent. Converse and Pierce (1986) 
argue that a threefold distinction, adding the partisan style to the trustee and delegate styles, 
is closer to capturing the political reality, specifically in party centered systems.  
In the discussion about styles of representation it is of importance what criterion 
representatives should use for decision making. For the delegate and partisan styles, the 
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criterion is in both cases a ‘will of a collective’, the voters for delegates and their party’s 
policy for the partisans. Önnudóttir (2014a: 2-3) makes the point that in both cases 
representatives’ own policy preferences can deviate from the preferences of the relevant 
collective, and that the emphasis is on that representatives’ policy choices and decision 
making reflecting the preference of the ‘collective’. Only in the case of the trustee style, the 
criterion for decision making coincides with the policy preferences of the representatives’ 
themselves because they are expected to use their own judgement when making decisions.  
Why representatives take on certain roles has been explained, under the rational 
choice approach, to be determined by the utility of different strategies to help representatives 
to reach their goals (Strøm 2012: 86-89). This approach assumes that representatives’ role-
choice is conditioned by the means they have to realise their preferences for a certain 
outcome, such as an election or selection as candidates. How they reach those goals is most 
notably conditioned by the rules of the electoral system and the control their parties have over 
their representatives’ career paths. Supporting this are the findings that the greater power the 
parties’ leaderships have over the selection of candidates, the more likely they are to contain 
a high number of partisan candidates and less of trustees, party socialisation encourages the 
partisan style and discourages the delegate style, and parties that are frequently represented in 
the government are more likely to contain a high number of trustees and less likely to contain 
a high number of delegates (Önnudóttir 2014b: 8-9). It has also been established that parties 
that contain a high proportion of trustee candidates have more congruence on the left-right 
continuum with its voters, compared to parties where the partisan style is widely emphasised 
(Önnudóttir 2014a: 15-16). These findings suggest that trustee parties can be regarded as 
those who gain the most from the status quo of the current political system, as they are both 
more often part of the government and are closer to their voters on the left-right continuum.  
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The dyadic link between parties and party voters 
As already mentioned, the partisan style is in line with RPM, which is as an ideal 
model for how representation should work (e.g. Thomassen 1994: 237). RPM assumes that 
political parties are the uniting link between the policy preferences of voters and 
representatives. The parties offer different policy packages, voters choose the policy package 
of a party that is closest to their own policy preferences and the parties’ representatives carry 
out the policy of their parties. RPM has been criticised because it does not give room for 
voters to choose parties based on other factors than their own or the parties’ policy 
preferences, for being too strict in assuming that voters know their own and/or the parties’ 
policy preferences, and because it does not offer flexibility for individual MPs to deviate 
from their party’s policies (e.g. Thomassen [1994]; Valen and Narud [2007: 294]).  
There are some aspects of RPM that have been shown to be more relevant than others, 
and those are about the link between representatives and parties. Parties do constrain 
politicians in their actions (Aldrich 2011: 297), and it has been established that partisan 
representatives are closer to their own party on policy compared to non-partisans (Wessels 
and Giebler 2011: 19). Given that party socialisation and the more control the parties’ 
leaderships have over nomination, the more likely parties are to contain a high proportion of 
partisans (Önnudóttir 2014b: 8-9), the part of RPM about whether this constraint translates 
into more positive evaluations of liberal democracy among the voters of those parties is tested 
here. Furthermore, if RPM is a successful model for representation, in the sense that those 
constraints lead to that the parties’ policies are implemented, voters of those parties should be 
happier with democratic performance when the representatives’ of their party stick to the 
party line or:  
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H1: The higher the proportion of partisans within parties, the more positively party 
voters evaluate the performance of liberal democracy.  
 
The delegate style assumes that voters’ opinion should be followed regardless of 
representatives own opinions or their party’s policy. This style has been criticized for being 
over-demanding, assuming that voters have stable and exogenous policy preferences 
(Thomassen 1994: 242-43), and it is unclear how those demands should be made known to 
representatives. It can be reasoned that the delegate style has a populist element to it, 
meaning that the will of voters should be decisive in policy making and actions are justified 
by appealing to the people (Jagers and Walgrave 2007: 322). Implicit in the delegate style is 
the assumption that voters are a united group, with ‘one single will’ that can be translated into 
decisions taken on their behalf. Parties that emphasise the delegate style are less often 
represented in government (Önnudóttir 2014b: 8-9) and for that reason they could be more 
likely to advocate a change from the status quo of the political system as they are not gaining 
from it as it is in terms of holding a government position. Furthermore, if the delegate style 
fits the populist platform of right-wing and/or anti-establishment parties, which have been 
shown to both mobilise on and fuel voters’ discontent (e.g. van der Brug [2003: 89]; Rydgren 
[2005: 419]), voters of delegate parties should express more negative evaluations of the 
performance of their democracies, including liberal the liberal aspect of their democracies. 
Thus, I hypothesise that:  
 
H2: The higher the proportion of delegates within parties the more negatively party 
voters evaluate the performance of liberal democracy. 
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The trustee style assumes that representatives use their own judgement when making policy 
decisions. Inherent in it is that representatives get a mandate from voters to make informed 
decisions based on their own deliberation. The trustee style has been shown to be more 
common among government-seeking parties, and it has been suggested that could be due to a 
socialisation effect, where representatives of those parties are more used to thinking about 
decision making for the greater good, a focus of representation which is closely linked to the 
trustee style (Önnudóttir 2014b: 9). A different line of argument is that the utility of the 
trustee style could be greater under Rohrschneider and Whitefield’s (2012: 23-26) ‘strain of 
representation’, which is the challenge parties in modern democracies face competing for and 
representing increasingly diverse voters. Under this strain the trustee style might be a useful 
strategy to secure as many votes as possible to maximise the parties’ chance of entering the 
government. Trustee parties have been shown to be more congruent with their voters on the 
left-right continuum, compared to partisan and delegate parties (Önnudóttir 2014a: 15-16). 
That could indicate that trustee parties are more successful in capturing both the votes of 
independent and partisan median voters, assuming that they maximise their share of votes 
close to the centre of the left-right spectrum, where the bulk of voters are placed. This could 
also mean that trustee parties are those who gain the most from the current political system, 
as they are both more often represented in government (Önnudóttir 2014b: 8-9) and closer to 
the median voter on policy. Trustee parties could thus be perceived as the defenders of the 
status quo of the political and institutional system and as such an attractive option for voters 
that evaluate the performance of liberal democracy as good and have less need for a change 
in the system compared to voters that evaluate it more negatively.  
 Regardless of whether the trustee style is emphasised because of strain of 
representation, due to a socialisation effect from being a part of a government-seeking party, 
or because those parties are the ones who gain the most from the current political system, all 
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reflect that the trustee style is promoted under certain conditions within the political system. 
The socialisation effect as such should not necessarily have consequences for party voters’ 
evaluations of their democratic system, but if the trustee style is a successful strategy to deal 
with the complexity of the issue space and diverse electorate, and are perceived as the 
defenders of the current political system, they should be an attractive option for voters that 
evaluate democratic performance more positively, or:  
 
H3: The higher the proportion of trustees within parties the more positively do party 
voters evaluate the performance of liberal democracy.  
Research design 
The main data-sources used in this paper are the Comparative Candidates Survey 
(CCS) and the European Social Survey (ESS) round six. Together CCS and ESS cover in 
total 72 parties from 11 countries: Belgium 2007, Denmark 2011, Germany 2009, Finland 
2011, Hungary 2010, Iceland 2009, Ireland 2007, the Netherlands 2006, Portugal 2009, 
Sweden 2010 and Switzerland 2011. Parties and party voters are paired into party dyads, 
linking the candidates’ party from the CCS data to voters of the same party in the ESS. In 3 
of the countries, Belgium, Ireland and the Netherlands, the question about vote-recall in the 
ESS data does not cover the same election as in the CCS data. Thus, I include a dummy for 
these in the models to control for a possible bias arising from the time lag between the CCS 
and ESS data.  
 
Party voters’ evaluations of the performance of liberal democracy 
In ESS round six from 2012 there is a battery of ten question pairs (all together 20 questions) 
that do tap into respondents’ evaluations of the performance of different aspects of liberal 
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democracy and the importance of those same factors in their respective countries. The 
questions are regarding the evaluation of the performance and importance of:1 
 
a. Free and fair elections (national) 
b. Voters discussing politics with people they know before deciding how to vote 
c. Different political parties offering clear alternatives to one another 
d. Opposition parties’ freedom to criticise the government 
e. The government explaining its decisions to voters 
f. The punishment of governing parties in elections when they have done a bad job 
g. The media’s freedom to criticise the government 
h. The media providing citizens with reliable information to judge the government 
i. The protection of the rights of minority groups 
j. The courts treating everyone the same 
 
Kriesi et al. (2016: 69-77) and Gómez and Palacios (2016: 161) treat those ten items as part 
of a liberal democracy scale2 which includes two subscales, electoral democracy (items a to f) 
and liberalism (items g to j). Kriesi et al. (2016: 69-77) show that the two subscales are 
highly correlated, meaning that if one is liberal democrat one is also an electoral democrat 
and the other way around. In this paper I use the ten items that evaluate the performance of 
liberal democracy, using the half of the question pairs that ask about how well each item 
applies to the respondents’ country. A mean score is calculated for each respondent’s 
evaluations of the performance of liberal democracy. Given that there might be a difference 
in the importance respondents place on each item, such as that some might say that it is 
extremely important for democracy that the government explains its decisions to voters while 
others rate it as only modestly important, each item on the evaluation scale is weighted by 
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how important respondents deem that item to be for democracy. In Appendix I, the procedure 
of the calculation of this scale and weighting is explained in more detail. In the final step, 
arriving at the party level and the response variable in my models, the means of the 
evaluations of the performance of liberal democracy are calculated for each group of party 
voters where higher values indicate more positive evaluations. A table showing the means for 
each group of party voters as well as values, and their sources, for all other variables used in 
this study is in Appendix II.  
  Figure 1 shows the mean values on the scale for the evaluations of liberal democracy 
for each country, and the dots around the country means show the distribution of the party 
means within each country. There is a country variation in the evaluation ratings, where those 
are lowest in Portugal and Hungary and highest in Sweden and Denmark. It is also noted that 
three of the eleven countries in this dataset, Portugal, Ireland and Iceland, were seriously 
affected by the global credit crunch in 2008 (Magalhães 2014b), which could lead to more 
negative evaluations for the performance of liberal democracy in those countries compared to 
times when their economies are in better shape. As a control variable, I calculate for each 
group of party voters the absolute distance between their means on evaluations of liberal 
democracy and the country mean. I include this measure in my models to control for a 
possible bias due to the country variation in voters’ evaluations of the performance of liberal 
democracy, thereby controlling for a possible bias due to differences in the countries’ 
economic performance.  
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Figure 1. Evaluation of liberal democratic performance, country and party means 
 
Styles of representation 
For styles of representation emphasised within parties I make use of three questions from the 
CCS project. Those are about how an MP should vote in parliament if there are different 
opinions between:  
 
1. The party position and his/her party voters’ opinion. 
2. Constituency voters’ opinion and MP’s opinion. 
3. Party position and MP’s opinion.  
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For each of the three styles I use two out of the three questions. Those who name the party in 
items 1 and 3 are partisans, those who say that the MP’s opinion when contrasted with voters 
and party in items 2 and 3 are trustees, and those who say that the MP should follow the 
voters’3 views in items 1 and 2 are delegates. Those who cannot be categorised according to 
this rule are coded as ‘non-classifiable’.   
Party measures on styles of representation are done by calculating the proportions of 
representatives within parties who are: 1) partisans, 2) delegates or 3) trustees. Table 1 shows 
an example of the distribution of styles within the Belgian parties. The party measure used in 
my models for the Socialist Party in Belgium is 39.0 for the proportion of partisans, 34.2 for 
trustees and 12.2 for delegates. 
 
Table 1. Styles of representation within parties, an example from Belgium 
 
 
Control variables  
Given that the number of observations are 72 party dyads from eleven elections, there is 
limited flexibility for a great number of control variables. By including the aforementioned 
control, the absolute distance between the parties’ and countries’ mean on evaluations of the 
% of partisans % of trustees % of delegates
% of non-
classifiables
N
Belgium
Socialist Party 39.0% 34.2% 12.2% 14.6% 41
Reformist Movement 28.3% 32.6% 13.0% 26.1% 46
Humanist Democratic Center 44.4% 33.3% 8.3% 13.9% 36
Ecolo 47.7% 27.3% 2.3% 22.7% 44
Christian Democratic and Flemish 41.7% 31.3% 16.7% 10.4% 48
New-Flemish Alliance 20.0% 33.3% 40.0% 6.7% 15
Soicalist Party. Different - SP.A 57.1% 28.6% 14.3% 0% 35
Open VLD (Flemish Liberals and Democrats) 32.0% 30.0% 28.0% 10.0% 50
Flemist Interest 38.2% 29.4% 23.5% 8.8% 34
Green! 32.1% 48.2% 12.5% 7.2% 56
Note: See a list for all parties in Appendix II
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performance of liberal democracy should, to some extent, control for a possible bias due to a 
differences in perceptions of the performance between countries. Other control variables are 
discussed shortly below.  
Given that right-wing voters and voters of government parties are more likely to 
evaluate liberal democracy more positively (Torcal and Trechsel 2016: 218-220), I include 
control variables for both of those factors. Older parties might be perceived as having a 
clearer policy position as perceived by voters (Dahlberg 2009: 272), a greater likelihood of 
having governing experience and to be part of the established political system. Because of 
this, voters of older parties might evaluate the performance of liberal democracy more 
positively, and thus I control for the parties’ age, using the number of years since the party 
was first elected to parliament. The effect of parties’ representation in government could be 
dependent on the age of the party, and for that reason an interaction term between those two 
variables is added to the models. Finally I control for the number of effective parties because 
a variety in policy options could bring about more positive evaluations of liberal democracy. 
The reasoning is that the more parties voters can choose from, the more likely it is that they 
find a fit between their own preferences and the preferences of the party they vote for 
(Wessels and Schmitt 2008: 20-21) and thus feel better represented and evaluate the 
performance of liberal democracy more positively.  
Party characteristics and party voters’ evaluations of democratic 
performance  
To test my hypotheses about the link between styles of representation emphasised 
within parties and party voters’ evaluations of the performance of liberal democracy, I use 
Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regressions. The proportions for styles of representation within 
parties are dependent on each other; a higher proportion in one group is followed by lower 
19 
 
proportions in the other two groups. Thus the regressions are done separately for each style 
group in three steps. In the first step, I include only the proportion for the extent to which the 
partisan, delegate or trustee styles are emphasised within parties. The second step adds other 
party characteristics, and the third one adds the control variables for the countries.  
 The first hypothesis (H1), that the higher proportion of partisans within parties there 
is, the more positively party voters evaluate liberal democracy in their country is not 
supported (Table 2). Explained variance is almost non-existent (R2: .01) with only the 
proportion of partisans in the first step, and the direction of the effect is only as hypothesised 
in the third step. In the delegate model, hypothesis two (H2) is supported; a higher proportion 
of delegates within parties goes together with more negative evaluations of the performance 
of liberal democracy. The third hypothesis (H3) is supported as well. The more prevalent the 
trustee style is within parties the more positively do its voters rate liberal democracy in their 
country.  
 In Figures 2 and 3 the unstandardized predicted values for party voters’ evaluation of 
liberal democratic performance are plotted for the two styles of representation that contribute 
to perceived democratic performance, both for the total number of parties and for each 
country4. Figure 2 shows a clear trend of a negative relation between the delegate style and 
evaluations of the performance of liberal democracy for almost all of the countries and the 
total number of parties. Dropping the outlier in the lower right corner (the Hungarian party 
Jobbik) lowers the explained variance from .33 to .28. In two countries, Denmark and 
Sweden, the relation is almost non-existent. In those two countries the range of the extent to 
which the delegate style is emphasised within parties is very narrow, and that is a possible 
explanation for the negligent effect there.   
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Table 2. Party attributes and party voters’ evaluations of liberal democratic 
performance  
 
 
In Figures 2 and 3 the unstandardized predicted values for party voters’ evaluation of liberal 
democratic performance are plotted for the two styles of representation that contribute to 
perceived democratic performance, both for the total number of parties and for each country4. 
Figure 2 shows a clear trend of a negative relation between the delegate style and evaluations 
of the performance of liberal democracy for almost all of the countries and the total number 
of parties. Dropping the outlier in the lower right corner (the Hungarian party Jobbik) lowers 
the explained variance from .33 to .28. In two countries, Denmark and Sweden, the relation is 
Step: 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3
% of party representatives who are: 
Partisans -.12 -.16 .17
Delegates -.39** -.37** -.45***
Trustees .45*** 50*** .35*
Party variables
Socialist/communist party/social 
democratic party
-.20 -.24* -.23* -.22* -.16 -.17+
Representation in government .15 .27 .06 -.04 -.03 .03
Party age .52* .41* .31 .31+ .53** .52**
Representation in government*party 
age
-.48 -.55 -.30 -.24 -.40 -.44
Distance between party voters' 
mean on democratic performance 
and the country means
.02 .04 -.03 .04 .06 .08
Country variables
Number of effective parties .33* .14 .12
Dummy variable for Belgium, 
Ireland and the Netherlands
-.58*** -.53*** -.27+
Intercept, p-value .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
R
2: .01 .12 .33 .16 .23 .47 .20 .32 .38
Change in R2 significant, p value: .318 .059 .000 .001 .102 .000 .000 .014 .145
Note: Response variable is party voters' evaluations of democratic performance on ten items. Cronhach's alpha for the ten 
items is .89. Higher values indicate better (perceived) performance. Significance levels: +p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; 
***p<0.001. N=72 party dyads. 
Partisan Delegate Trustee
Standardized Betas Standardized Betas Standardized Betas
21 
 
almost non-existent. In those two countries the range of the extent to which the delegate style 
is emphasised within parties is very narrow, and that is a possible explanation for the 
negligent effect there.   
 
Figure 2. Predicted values for party voters’ evaluations of liberal democratic 
performance and the proportion of delegates within parties 
 
Examining the relation between the proportion of trustees within parties and the predicted 
values for party voters’ evaluation of the performance of liberal democracy, there is a strong, 
almost universal, positive trend (Figure 3). The total variance explained is quite high, .56, and 
in all countries except Iceland, there is a positive linear trend, indicating that the more the 
trustee style is emphasised the happier party voters are about the performance of liberal 
democracy. In Iceland, there seems to be no relation, or even a slight negative trend, 
indicating that in that country there are other factors than the extent to which the trustee style 
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is emphasised that explains voters’ perceptions of the performance liberal democracy. In 
Belgium the trend is positive, but it is driven by one party, the Green Party. But in general, 
the trustee style seems to be a strong mover of party voters’ perceived performance of liberal 
democracy in their countries.  
 
Figure 3. Predicted values for party voters’ evaluations of liberal democratic 
performance and the proportion of trustees within parties 
 
Conclusion 
The extent to which the delegate and trustee styles are emphasised within parties are 
clearly linked to party voters’ evaluations of the performance of liberal democracy in their 
countries. For both the partisan and the trustee style, party voters’ evaluations of liberal 
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democratic performance are more positive the higher the proportion of each style within 
parties, but only in the case of the trustee style is this effect strong enough to gain statistical 
significance. The negligible effect of the partisan style indicates that RPM might not be a 
successful model to mobilise and attract voters that evaluate the performance of liberal 
democracy positively. However, whether this holds true if the number of units is increased is 
beyond the scope of this paper, but is a clear avenue of future research to build upon.  
Finding that the more the delegate style is prevalent within parties the worse party 
voters evaluate the performance of liberal democracy goes against the popular belief that the 
‘will of the voters’ is a successful decision making style in politics. It is also quite possible 
that protest parties, such as extreme right-wing parties and/or anti-establishment parties, are 
more likely to emphasise the delegate style because that style fits their populist message 
referring to ‘the will of the people’ against the political establishment. Given that such parties 
are prone to both mobilise on and fuel the discontent of voters (e.g. van der Brug [2003: 89]; 
Rydgren [2005: 419]), the delegate style could both be a useful strategy to capture the votes 
of discontent voters as well as contribute to their discontent. Furthermore, delegate parties are 
less often represented in government (Önnudóttir 2014b: 8-9) and are as such underprivileged 
in terms of government status and more likely to support a change in the current political 
system. Delegate parties can be regarded as parties that are not happy with the state of affairs 
in their political systems, and attract to voters that evaluate liberal democracy more 
negatively compared to voters of other kinds of parties. 
The fact that an increasing proportion of trustees within parties goes together with 
more positive evaluations of the performance of liberal democracy could reflect that the 
trustee style is a successful strategy to mobilise heterogeneous voters on a diverse issue 
space. Under Rohrschneider and Whitefield’s (2012: 23-26) ‘representational strain’, parties 
might promote the trustee style as a strategy to maximise votes. ‘New’ issues on the political 
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agenda, such as the protection of the environment or immigration (Hooghe et al.2002: 976-
77), are an add-on to ‘older’ traditional issues such as privatisation and social-security. Given 
that parties cannot mobilise only partisan voters on all of those issues, they have to convince 
as many voters as possible that they are competent enough to deal with all of them. Under 
those conditions, the trustee style might work better, than both the partisan and the delegate 
style, as a useful strategy to capture as many votes as possible. The success of the trustee 
style for party voters’ evaluations of the performance of liberal democracy in their country 
could also indicate that trustee parties, which have been shown to be more often represented 
in government (Önnudóttir 2014b: 8-9), and are closer to their voters on the left-right space 
(Önnudóttir 2014a: 15-16), are parties that gain from the current political and institutional 
system. Those parties can therefore be considered to be defenders of the status quo and to feel 
low or no need for a change in the system, and to be able to mobilise voters that feel the same 
and evaluate the performance of liberal democracy positively. If this is the case, it has 
implications for an understanding of why the different styles are promoted, and that one of 
the incentives for parties to emphasise certain styles is how much they gain from their current 
political system and they are able to translate this gain or loss into mobilising the votes of 
voters’ that share their need for either protecting the status quo or their need for a change. 
The results in this paper give a valuable insight into how different workings of parties 
are linked with different levels of evaluations of liberal democratic performance between 
groups of party voters. This does not mean that party voters are aware of the prevalent styles 
of representation within parties nor the extent to which each style is emphasised. Even if 
party voters are not aware of the extent to which the different styles of representation are 
emphasised within parties, they are presented with other things, such as how the parties 
convey their message, most notably through political campaigns. Whether there is a 
difference in how parties campaign or inform voters by other means about their policy 
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preferences, depending on which style of representation is emphasised within parties, could 
be considered for future research. The importance of party characteristics in explaining 
evaluations of liberal democratic performance on the level of political parties has 
implications for research on the individual level for performance evaluations. Both the 
different attributes of parties, such as their emphasis in how to represent and the difference 
between party voters’ in their perceptions about what is considered important for democracy, 
should be taken into account when analysing evaluations of democratic performance.  
 
Endnotes 
1. See Appendix I for the full question text and response scales. 
2. In Gómez and Palacios‘ (2016: 161) construction of the scale for respondents‘ 
evaluations of the performance of liberal democracy they use one additional item 
about whether politicians take into account the views of other European government 
before making decisions. This item ranks the lowest in Kriesi et al’s (2016; 73) 
analysis of the importance placed on liberal democracy, and for that reason, as well as 
that it could be linked to how integrated the countries are in European affairs, I 
exclude the item from the calculation of the scale for evaluation of liberal democratic 
performance.  
3. There is a difference in terminology about voters between questions 1 and 2, the 
former asking about ‘his/her party voters’ and the latter about ‘constituency voters’. 
However, both are contrasted with either the party position or the MP’s own opinion. 
For that reason it is meaningful to apply the delegate role to those who name voters in 
question 1 and 2 and contrast them with partisans and trustees. 
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4. The predicted values are calculated from full models (step 3) of the three regression 
models presented in Table 2. The dummy variables for social democratic/left wing 
parties and Belgium, Ireland and the Netherlands are held constant at 1. Other 
variables are held constant at their means. 
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Appendix I -  
 
Questions in the European Social Survey round six, about different aspects of democracy.  
 
Questions about importance: 
 
Using this card, please tell me how important you think it is for democracy in general… 
 
 …that national elections are free and fair? 
 …that voters discuss politics with people they know before deciding how to vote? 
 …that different political parties offer clear alternatives to one another? 
 …that opposition parties are free to criticise the government? 
 …that the media are free to criticise the government? 
 …that the media provide citizens with reliable information to judge the government? 
 …that the rights of minority groups are protected? 
 …that the courts treat everyone the same? 
 …that governing parties are punished in elections when they have done a bad job? 
 …that the government explains its decisions to voters? 
 
Response scales are on 11 point scales from 0 (not at all important for democracy) to 10 
(extremely important for democracy).  
 
Questions about performance:  
 
Using this card, please tell me to what extent you think each of the following statements 
applies in [country]. 0 means that you think the statement does not apply at all and 10 means you 
think it applies completely. 
 
 National elections in [country] are free and fair. 
33 
 
 Voters in [country] discuss politics with people they know before deciding how to 
vote. 
 Different political parties in [country] offer clear alternatives to one another. 
 Opposition parties in [country] are free to criticise the government. 
 The media in [country] are free to criticise the government. 
 The media in [country] provide citizens with reliable information to judge the 
government. 
 The rights of minority groups in [country] are protected. 
 The courts in [country] treat everyone the same. 
 Governing parties in [country] are punished in elections when they have done a bad 
job. 
 The government in [country] explains its decisions to voters? 
 
Response scales are on 11 point scales from 0 (does not apply at all) to 10 (applies 
completely).  
 
 
The calculation of a ten-item scale, capturing respondents’ evaluations of democratic 
performance: 
 
The mean score on the ten items are calculated for each individual respondent. Each item is 
weighted by the importance the respondent places on that item. In this process the importance 
ratings are rescaled to an 11 point scale ranging from 0 to 1. For example, if a respondent 
gives ‘a free and fair election’ a score of five and ‘courts treat ought to treat everyone the 
same’ a score of 8 on the importance ratings, his performance evaluations of ‘free and fair 
elections’ is weighted by .5 and by .8 of ‘courts treat everyone the same’ in the calculation of 
the respondent’s mean on a ten-item scale of for his/her evaluation of democratic 
performance. 
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